Deposition of Langdon Gilkey

No. LR-C-81-322

ET AL. *
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Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
** For the Plaintiffs

Attorney-at-Law, Assistant
Attorney General, Attorney
General's Office
Justice Building
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
** For the Defendants

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a witness produced on behalf of the Plaintiffs,
taken in the above-styled and numbered cause on the
25th day of November, 1981, before Certified Court
Reporters and Notaries Public in and for Fulton
County, Georgia, at American Civil Liberties Union,
88 Walton Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, at approxi-
mately 9:45 a.m., pursuant to the agreement therein-
after set forth.

(Whereupon, the reading and signing
of the deposition by the witness was


having been first duly sworn, was examined and deposed
as follows:



Q Good morning, Professor Gilkey.

A Good morning.

Q May name is Rick Campbell. I am with the
Arkansas Attorney General's office. As you probably
know, our office is representing the State Board of
Education and other Defendants in this action concern-
ing the constitutionality of Act 590 of 1981 of the
State of Arkansas. Today I am going to ask you just


a few questions about your background, about your
interest in the area of Scientific Creationism, and
then about your prospective testimony at trial.

If, at any time during the deposition today
you would like to stop and get a drink of water or
get a Coke or go to the restroom, please let me know
and we can do that. There will be no problem with
that whatsoever.

I am really hear to learn as much as I
can about where you are coming from and I think you
will get a little vision from our conversation today
as to where I am coming from and some of the possible
arguments that the State may try to have with connec-
tion to this litigation.

First of all, let me ask you to give me
your full name and address, please.

A Langdon Brown Gilkey. **** ***** ******
******, *******, *****.

Q Are you married?

A Yes.

Q If during the course of the deposition I
refer to you as Dr. Gilkey instead of Professor
Gilkey, please excuse me for that.

A I will forgive you.

Q Do you have any children, Professor Gilkey?


A Yes, I have three children.

Q How old are they?

A One of them is 22; one of them is 14; and
one of them is 12.

Q Have all the children attended public or
private school?

A Private school.

Q What type of school was that?

A Well, one of them attended -- the older
one attended Trinity School in New York, in the class
of John McEnroe. The other two attend the Laboratory
School of the University of Chicago.

Q What is that?

A That is a private school run by the
Education Department of the University of Chicago.

Q Do you know if in those classes the
subject of origins is taught?

MR. ANTHONY J. SIANO: I would like
that term defined, please.

THE WITNESS: I was going to say that
I could distinguish two aspects of the
question of origins.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) All right, sir.

A One is what one might call ultimate origins,
which is of interest to the philosopher and the


theologian, but more to the theologian than the
philosopher. The other is the question of origins
of this or that form of life, the earth, planetary
system of the nebulous; ask that, but don't ask the
question of where does everything come from.

So let's go back, and you can rephrase
that question, possibly, so that I can know which
way to answer it.

Q All right, sir. I appreciate that.

Is the subject of ultimate origins discussed
in that?

A No.

Q Is there a discussion of origins of this
or that form of life?

A Yes, sir; yes.

Q Do you know how that is discussed?

A By hearsay only, let me say that, because
I listen to my son telling me about what he has been
studying. But they -- I know that they have studied
-- I won't be accurate about this, let me make clear
-- I know they have studied what are called the
cavemen and women, the early forms of humanity. I
don't believe yet they have dealt with the issue of
the -- of the origin of species, one out of another.

Now, I may be wrong about that, but I don't


think that has come up yet. But early forms of what
are taken to be early forms of human existence, the
kind of thing you get in Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon
and so forth and so on. My son comes home and talks
to me about this, that, and the other. I know they
have been talking about that. I think that they have
had some geology. Actually, the scientific courses
in grade school, middle school, and in early high
school, are not geology and biology --

Q General science?

A Yes.

Q The distinction you made between ultimate
origins and origins of this and that form of life,
would that be the same distinction you talked about
in your writings concerning first causation and
secondary causation?

A Yes, roughly. The question of first
causation is the question of ultimate origins. It
is part of the hypothesis of modern science that
forms of life arise out of secondary causality.
That is rather precisely put.

What the argument is about, I would say,
is whether the species arise directly from the first
cause or from the workings of secondary causality.
We are using here in first and secondary causality


Thomistic language, which is the language of the
Catholic tradition, and is familiar to them. This
isn't language familiar to the Protestant tradition.
It is quite appropriate language.

The first causality is the causality of
God. We are talking about Christians, causality of
God in bringing finite beings out of nothing. This
is a causality which any scientists, we don't know
anything about, and we can't talk about it. In that
sense, that is a philosophical and/or theological
question. Most philosophers would say we can't talk
about it, either. Most modern philosophers, for
various reasons, we could talk about it.

But the question of how a finite form of
life arises out of secondary causality could be a
scientific question if they wish to address themselves
to it. One might put it that the scientific community
agrees they are stuck with secondary causality
entirely. There is a kind of roof over it, a limita-
tion to what they can talk about. The theologians,
on the whole, agree that all they can usually talk
about is primarily finite. That is what their task
is, and I would agree with that.

Q Just so I can make sure that we are
talking about -- that I am using the right language,


you referred to it as primary causality and secondary
causality; is that correct?

A Yes. Secondary causality is what we
would ordinarily call if -- we wouldn't ordinarily
use these words, probably -- causes that are finite
in character, or you could say natural historical
human causes. Primary causality would always be
the divine cause.

Now, obviously in the doctrine of Creation
out of nothing, you have only the divine cause; there
aren't any secondary causes, because that is what is
being produced. At least, that is the doctrine. That
is what you mean by an absolute beginning. There isn't
anything there except God, and then secondary causes
are produced in some kind of a system. So things
begin to get going.

Q So your scientific inquiry --

A It can't go beyond that barrier.

Q From the second causality?

A Right. It can't go beyond that barrier,
yes. This is a self-limitation. If it does, it leaves
the laboratory.

Q Let me ask you again, you used the word
-- was it Thoistic (sic)?

A St. Thomas Aquinas. T-h-o-m-i-s,



Q What is that, again?

A Well, St. Thomas Aquinas was the official,
let's see, later declared to be the official philoso-
pher of the Roman Catholic tradition. In his own
time, he took rather a beating because he said some
new things. But he became the official philosophee
of the Roman Catholic tradition.

I don't think I could say that any longer.
But for a long time, he was that. So Thomism was
a Catholic, Roman Catholic, and Anglo-Catholic
philosophy. They are the ones that use this conception
of first cause and second cause, more than any other
tradition. It is far too philosophical, and not
enough scriptural, because you don't find primary
and secondary causology as phrases used in the
scripture at all; though, I think it is a legitimate
implication of the first chapter of Genesis and
Psalms and so forth.

Nevertheless, this is philosopher's
talk rather than preacher's talk. Let's put it that

Q What would a protestant -- how would he
react to the primary and secondary causation arguments?

MR. SIANO: I am going to object


to that question. It is a hypothetical and
abstracted. Are you defining protestant
as a particular denomination?

Q (By Mr. Campbell) I am not talking about
a particular denomination. I am separating Catholicism,
that type of thinking from the general Protestant
thinking. These would be the terms of primary causality
And secondary causality would be language of St.
Thomas Aquinas as opposed to, generally, the Protestant'



A Right. Well, now Protestantism is a big
bag. The Reformation, which is what I suppose -- first
of all, the Protestant tradition was not interested
in philosophy at all. They sought to stick to the
words of the Scripture, and so have the Calvarist
and the Lutheran tradition on the whole. They've
been uneasy about philosophy.

Now, there has developed various forms
of what I suppose we can usefully call liberal
Protestantism, which has represented both European and
Elghish and American philosophies in the Nineteenth
Century -- Galvin, Kantian, this, that, and the other.
They're quite happy with philosophy. However, they're
not Thomies. That is to say, they're not a Thirteenth
Century Catholic philosophy based on Aristotle; so
they would not be using this, but perhaps for another
reason. All right?

America is not made up primarily of Lutheran
or Puritans, though the latter started the place
anyway, at least the Northern part -- not the Southern
part, but the Northern part. And it's made up of
groups like -- on the whole, like the Methodists, the
Baptists -- which I am one, so I'm not talking down
the religion, who have not been interested in philosophy;
have been interested in the Bible, and they, for a


slightly different reason would not be interested
in this kind of language, either.

Now, this doesn't mean that a Baptist
community doesn't go to school and study philosophy,
study theology, and maybe wants to use primary and
secondary causality. I'm not trying to say that.
But on the whole, the traditions haven't found this
kind of language, that's what I mean. But, Protestan-
tism is a lot of things. Of course, Catholicism, up
to recently, was one thing; now it's a number of things.

Q I see. You mentioned that you were a
Baptist, and for whatever it's worth, I am, too; so I
really appreciate it -- your comments.

Is there a particular branch of the
Baptist Church that you are a member of?

A Yes, yes. I'm a member of the American
Baptist Church. My father was a Baptist Minister.

MR. SIANO: And I'm going to object
to inquiry as to personal belief systems,
unless there's some particular direction
you're going in.

MR. CAMPBELL: Throughout the deposition,
Mr. Siano and I may exchange comments about
the relevancy of particular questions. It
has nothing to do with you; so please don't


take it personally. It's just part of our


Q (By Mr. Campbell) (Continuing) How large
is the American Baptist Church?

A I must admit, I don't know. It's not
nearly as big as the Southern Baptist Church; I know

Q How does the American Baptist Church view
primary and secondary causation?

A Well, now, one of the things about the
Baptist, at least the Northern Baptist, is that
everybody rows his own boat. Whether that's true of
the Southern Baptist is an interesting question. But
everybody does row their own boat, and there's lots
of diversity.

There is the American Baptist, who were
instrumental in the development of liberal Protestantism.
There are a number there who are much more conservative
and so it's a little hard to describe them as a whole.

As I say, anybody can go now to a modern --
will go if they're interested, and this sort of thing --
go to a modern university, like, the University of
Chicago or the Harvard Divinity School or the Yale
Divinity School. They may come in looking one way,


and they may come out looking another way. So it's
a little hard to specify what this one -- the Northern
Baptist, and I think the Southern Baptist, too, are
a mixture of very different points of view.

Q That's what I was getting at. Do you know
of any church position concerning the primary and
secondary causation in the American Baptist Church?

A No.

Q Do you know of any church position concerning
primary and secondary causation in the Southern
Baptist Churches?

A Not in those terms. Well, I'm really
guessing, so I don't want to say.

Q What is the liberal Protestantism? What
does that include?

A I would say, first one wishes to distinguish
between what one could call the liberal spirit toward
tolerance, towards other points of view, interest in
other points of view; not walking out of the room when
someone disagrees with you, and so forth and so on.
And at that point, I think one could say that whatever
one's theology, one can have that kind of a view of
other people. Using the word "liberal" as describing
a type of thinking is a different matter; right?
So I'm -- I'm using it that way historically, how we


would describe a movement with this word.

I would say with the Eighteenth Century,
modern science especially physics -- Isaac Newton
appeared very powerfully on the scene -- very, very
powerfully on the scene. This is prior to geology,
prior to biology. This is arising out of the develop-
ment of physics in the Seventeenth Century. And as a
result of this movement, I think that's where it started,
there came the enlightenment, which you probably know
about, a kind of new view of everything on the part of
the European and the Early American community.

Jefferson is a good -- of course, a good
example of this. It spread out from science into
political fault, and our Constitution and Bill of
Rights, and so forth, are very directly dependent
on that, as you probably know.

This really was a new world. It was
different from the orthodox. And religious thinkers,
leading preachers, teachers, and so forth, especially
in Europe -- of course, we weren't getting going
much then -- found this world a part of themselves,
as technology is part of us now, and they were also

So they tried to think out how to relate
their Christian thought to the new world, really, of


science, but also of political thought, a new sense
of ethics. One should help to make the world more
just rather than merely not doing this and not doing
that, and so forth and so on. And liberal Christianity
was the effort to create an interpretation of Christiani
that fit in this world, and this developed from, let's
say, 1800 in Europe -- we could push it back a little
further, but that's a good time -- right on up through.

An effort to reinterpret Christianity
on the basis of -- now, not -- well, let me say "on
the basis" is wrong here; but so that an interpretation
of Christianity based upon Scripture and tradition
could relate itself to this new world.

Q Was there a split, say, around 1800, a
significant split between, say, liberal thinkers or
liberal Protestantism and conservative Protestantism.
I mean, how do you --

A That split doesn't appear very much in
this country except for the kinds of arguments that
you get on the East Coast among people who participated
in this kind of thought; and then you have -- I
suppose one could say the liberals were then deist,
and there were a number -- well, Jefferson would have
been a good example of a deist. I think he called
himself a deist. And he would have -- he did disagree


quite explicitly with what he would have termed the

With Jonathan Edwards, let's say, up in
New England and the Puritans, and you get that kind of
a split, that's not the same kind you get later. But
a real difference between orthodoxy and the free-
thinkers, let's put it, as they call themselves, that's
the way the split would have appeared then.

As it began to develop in Europe about the
same time -- a much more sophisticated culture than
ours, of course, in 1800; there is no doubt about it.
You have most of the philosophical community in
Germany and England who were Christian. That is to
say, they regard themselves as Christian.

In France, a good number of them didn't
want anything to do with Christianity, and so there's
a bit of difference here, and one can see this in the
French Revolution. This is an anti-church movement,
whereas, the enlightenment was not anti-church in
neither Germany or England, though there were some
people who were. But obviously, a split is beginning
to develop here between orthodoxy, Lutheran, Calvanists,
Presbyterian, some developments of Catholicism, and
this rethinking liberal theology; and that split goes
all the way along. It really surfaces in America, I


think, a great deal later towards the end of the
Nineteenth Century, where you have people now who --
we've got a -- we're in a different age and we have
people who may have interpreted Christianity along
an evolutionary line, on a doctoral line, let's say
on a liberal line, who are beginning to talk about
social Christianity; that is, Christianity interested
in social form, and you get the social gospel developing

Now, this is 1890, 1900, and so forth,
and you begin -- this is the point at which one has
the rise of fundamentalists because they're conscious
of another type of Christianity appearing. Before
that, I don't think the issue was drawn, so to speak.

But you take the Evolutionist Movement,
for example, in the North. Here's a type social
Christianity, but Evangelics were very much involved
in it. Overlin, for example, ran the underground
railway and, yet, was the center of Evangelicism.
So you don't have much of a split there, but it
develops -- it develops at the end of the century;
and so you get a real tussle between those who are
seeking to save the fundamentals and those who are
moving, so to speak, in tune with the culture.

Q When you mentioned Christianity moving
along evolutionary lines --


A Yes.

Q -- what does that mean? I mean, what
were you --

A An interpretation of Christianity that
reinterprets the primary causality of God. Let's go
back to that language, though they might not have used
that language at that time.

As working through secondary causes,
finite causes, and the scientists were beginning to
talk about the development of the cosmos, the nebular
hypothesis, the whole development of astronomy and
the development of various forms of life, the Darwinian
as the way God is working.

Q I see. So the liberal Protestantism would
have gone off in that direction thinking that God was
working through the secondary hypothesis or causation --

A Yeah.

Q Whereas, the more conservative or funda-
mentalists or --

A Right.

Q -- or fundamental Protestants would have
gone off in the direction that what, where there was
a liberal -- God caused everything right, or what
would be their position at that same time?

A Their position would be that the origin of


species is not a question of secondary causality, but
of primary causality. That's the essence of their
position. Now, if species are permanent, they don't
arise out of second causes; they go right back to the

So that the question of the origin, let's
say, of the giraffe, is not a scientific question, but
a theological question, because the giraffe goes right
back to the beginning, and the giraffe was on Noah's
Ark, Adam named it, et cetera, et cetera.

This is a question of primary causality.

To make it a question of secondary causality
is really quite a revolutionary step, and this is a
step that Darwin made. That is to say that species
are not permanent. They don't go back to the
beginning; they arise. And this was the step that
Lyle made and Hutton in geology. Mountains were not
there at the beginning, even beautiful mountains of
England that have coal in them, as they used to say,
put there for the English to keep themselves warm,
these have arisen in the process of time.

Now, this is a very different view. See,
what you're doing is changing from primary to secondary
causality, which is to say, also, you're bringing it
under the umbrella of science. This becomes a


scientific question, how did the hills arise, and
that's the origin of this science of geology.
Biology came next. Incidentally, the progressivist
hypothesis is not biological in its origin. It actually
came up in history; Then in geology; then in biology,
as it was in the middle of the Eighteenth Century
that people began to talk abou the progress of human

Before that time, they had never thought
that they were higher than the Greeks, and there was an
argument in the Seventeenth Century between ancients
and the moderns, those who said Greek and Roman
culture was higher than we were, which everybody up
to that time had thought -- well, not the Mediaeval
Age, but since the Renaissance. And then they said,
no; we have science. And, therefore, the young
fellows, not the old fellows -- the young vellows are
the Greeks, and we stand on their shoulders, which is
the way probably we would feel. And with that, you
get a sense of progress in time, which gets then
taken up again in geology and again in the Nineteenth
Century and becomes the central idea of the Nineteenth

Q All right, sir. Let me see if I've got
this right, and please correct me if I'm wrong.


So at one time, say, in the Eighteenth
Century, there was really no distinction between
science and religion, and to the extent that everything
was assumed to be a primary causation, to use the
terms that we've used today; and then at some point
in time in the Eighteenth Century or early Nineteenth
Century, there was a break, and some people could
make a distinction between the primary and the
secondary causality, and others, either unwilling
to change or unwilling to bend, stayed with the
primary causality viewpoint.

MR. SIANO: I'm going to object to
the question. I'll object on the form
basis in that that seems to be not really
a complete summary of the testimony, and
I think the transcript will speak for
itself. I would suggest that we not
clutter the record with synopses of what
Professor Gilkey is saying, in that what
he's saying has got a great deal in it,
and I don't think that either one of us
sitting here could make a fair summary of
what that was.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) (Continuing) I'm really
asking, at some point in our history, then, there was


no distinction between, you know, primary and secondary

A Let me amend that a little bit. It all
depends on what a religious group thinks is what God
intended us to know. Now, it would be wrong to say
that tussle between religion and science begins in
the Eighteenth Century, because -- Galileo is a good
example of that tussle back a little earlier -- because
at that point, the Catholic Church had itself involved
with what one could call the Aristotelian view and
the Talmaic system, and they thought that was associated
with their own religion. They don't any longer.

But what Galileo was saying, and what
Percuncus had been saying -- but Galileo was the one
who took the beating, so you had a big tussle. This
didn't bother the Calvanists, for some interesting
historical reasons. And most of the earlier scientists
and England were Calvanists. An awful lot of them were
preachers. Newton was one; Ray was one; Prestley was
one; Bull was one, and so forth.

There is an interesting relationship between
the reformed tradition as the Calvanist tradition and
the development of modern science, especially in
England, in Holland, and Switzerland. These were the
centers of it. That's a funny relation. It's hard


to document, but it's there.

Then, when the issue of the history of
the earth began to appear, then you began to get a
tussle with that tradition; and you see that at the
beginning of the Nineteenth Century in the argument
about geology.

When a good many of the theories that
are now appearing -- catastrophism and so forth,
neptunism, vulcanism, and so on -- appeared within
the geological community, they subsequently disappeared,
with the establishment of geology as a science. But
there was a real tussle going on then. That was a
real tussle, and people came -- hundreds of people
came to listen to geological lectures, which is

Of course, at that point, the mosaic
history was under some kind of discussion. This is
geology; not yet Darwin. Darwin is the unlucky guy
who gets the blame for all of this, but it went on a
good deal before that.

So it comes and goes. It comes and goes,
this issue.

Q So what we really have is a -- or what
we have here, there are some religions which can
adapt to scientific progress, so to speak, and others


who just can't handle it.

Q Or some of them will adapt to this; some
of them will adapt to that. Now, I mean, let's say,
I don't imagine -- though I'm not speaking as an
expert here -- that fundamentalism has any problem
with Isaac Newton. I don't imagine they have any
problem with Kerpunkas, though I have met fundamentalist
who think the earth is flat, and it's very hard to
argue them out of it. But that's neither here nor there.

Generally speaking, the fundamentalists
in America would accept Newtonian physics -- in fact,
they'd probably regard that as physics -- and most
of the astronomy that's come from Kerpunkas and the
changes there. Right? They have a hard time with
geology and -- now, most of us in religious studies
have a hard time with psychology, for example. Now,
I can go on talking about that, if you'd wish.

But when they say this is science, I agree
with them; but then I think there's more to say. So
that where it comes up is -- and part of the problem
of theology is to see, decide what is valid within
a Christian perspective of a scientific movement and
what is not.

Generally, I think that what is not turns
out to be a philosophical, what, expansion of science


into a total view. But then that's not science; that's



A So I would be uneasy to say that everybody
involved in religion, which I am, and I am not
involved as a student, but as a theologian and member
of the Christian community seeking to reflect upon
Christianity and its relation to what else we know
in the world, I think it isn't as if some people can't
adapt at all and some people can adapt right across
the board. We can talk more about that if you would
like to. But I wouldn't want to be put in the position
of saying that because there is no question that the
Fundamentalist community America adapts to a good
deal of philosophy. I wouldn't wish to say they
were anti-scientific in that direct sense.

Q Generally speaking, can you characterize
the threat that Fundamentalists may feel from these
scientists which they have not adapted to?

MR. SIANO: I would like to have a
clarification of the phrase "threat."

Q (By Mr. Campbell) In other words, obviously
some people have been able to adapt to science, and
I think you have. What you are saying is that the
science is no threat to Christianity?

A Yes, I believe that.

Q Because Christianity is broad enough to
encompass that. And science has limits, and science


can only go so far, and beyond that, you are into the
theological realm?

A That is a very important point.

Q What I am really saying is, I am wondering
why couldn't everyone, you know, if there is a
general reason, you know, go ahead and say the same
thing? Why do they feel their religion is not big

A I am glad to answer your question, if it
is clear that this is a speculative answer on my

Q I understand that.

A I am no expert in the mind of the
Fundamentalist or in the ankh, the anxiety of the
Fundamentalist. My answer is speculative. We live
in a scientific culture. I would disagree with this
professionally in my own thoughts and so forth,
where it is generally felt that what science says is
the truth and the only truth, almost like the oath
I took here. So that if science says something isn't
there, then it isn't there, that is part of the problem.
They define reality for us, and I don't think that
is what they are about. Okay.

Now, I would take it that the Fundamentalist
Movement accepts this point, which they shouldn't.


I think a good deal of the academic world of America
also accepts it. Being a theologian in a university
is a bazaar thing to be, to lots of my colleagues.
If you take that assumption, that the only truths
about reality, they like to say what is the case,
are truths established by science or as they like to
say, and you find this in their documents, scientific
facts, then if science denies something, they get
very, very nervous.

And a child comes home and says, I have
been taught scientifically that such and such is
the case. God didn't appear in this scenario, which
from my point of view, God should not, because this is
a scientific account; therefore, it is concluded by
both child and parent that they have been taught
there is no God.

Now, how do you resolve that? I would
say you have a discussion somewhere in school about
the different levels of truth. That is not a biology
class. What is it? It is a comparative thinking
class or philosophy of science and philosophy of
religion class, or possibly comparative views, world
views, where these things could be discussed. I think
that would be a very good idea. I am not running the
education, but I think that would be the place to


settle this issue. Then we could talk about what is
artistic truth, what is moral truth, what is religious
truth, and what is scientific truth. These are
important issues, but they are not biological issues,
and so forth and so on.

I think the anxiety arises in the scientific
culture, where science is said to be the arbiter of
what is real and not real, and science is suddenly
found not to talk about God. Therefore, they are
saying God doesn't exist. And there is feeling that
if you have got these two hypotheses, they are
parallel. They are not at all parallel. One of them
is quite limited, and therefore relatively certain.
We can be sure of that. I feel sure. I am glad they
are relatively certain.

I long ago decided it was foolish of a
theologian to fly somewhere and then beat up science.
I have a good deal of colleagues that do this. They
say, I am sorry, I have a meeting and I have to take
an airplane.

Q I see your point.

A I won't say, and I don't mean to imply,
that theology or philosophy is the resolution of
this problem. Just as in the high school course, you
don't have exactly the top level or far-out level of


biology, so I am not talking about that. But I
wish there were some way this could be discussed.

Q so it really becomes a question of what
is reality or what is final reality?

A That's the major philosophical question.
It is also, of course, basically a theological
question. Our culture -- and here I would say the
Fundamentalists and some scientists may join together,
and would say, no physics tells us about this. The
physicist would say, I can't put it that way, but
lots of people would think when the physicist talks
about atoms, that is what was really real.

Subsequently, with Bohr and Heizenberg
and some others, they found the atom wasn't all there
was, and there have been developments since then.
But that question of what is really real is a theological
question and philosophical question. It really shouldn't
be a scientific question. If I make myself clear?

Q Yes, I understand that. You are employed
at the University of Chicago?

A Correct.

Q What are you teaching there?

A I teach in the area we call theology,
which is an area within the divinity school, whose
main business is training Ph.D.'s. We have a


ministerial program, but it is rather minor. Because
we are a university, we are nondenominational and
so forth. Our main business is Ph.D.'s.

Within that school, there is the study of
what we call the history of religion. Somebody wants
to study Buddhism, Hinduism, and so forth. There is
the study of the scripture, Jewish scripture. There
is the study of the history of Christianity or
really of Western Religion. It is called the history
of Christianity, but you can study Judaism in it.
There is the ethics in society. There is religion
and psychological studies. There is religion and the
arts or religion and literature, primarily. And there
is theology, which would be the study of the reflec-
tive, reflective side of religion, and primarily a
Western Religion.

We have Jewish students studying the
history of Jewish religion. We are Christians, I
am, and my Catholic colleagues are, and so forth. But
we would welcome a Jewish thinker or Buddhist
thinker and so forth.

That is a practical problem, not a
theoretical problem. Within that, my main responsi-
bility is Protestant theology. Now, I have a colleague
who knows all about the Reformation, so I don't stray


onto that turf. But I do know something about it.
There is a medievalist there who does early Christian
thoughts, medieval thought. And once in a while I
teach courses there. But mainly, I am teaching
Protestant thought from the enlightenment to the
present. I teach courses in particular thinkers,
which is -- you studied philosophy and you have the
same kind of thinking we have. You can study Plato;
you can study Aristotle; DeCarte. We would take
great theologians, Paul Tiller, and so forth, and
teach courses of that sort.

You can also teach the doctrine of God,
the doctrine of Creation, religion and science,
nature of history. One can develop a whole spring
of those. I have courses of all that sort of thinking.

Q When you are teaching or when you have
taught about Protestant theology or the doctrine of
Creation, religion and science, and origins as dis-
cussed, if it ever is --

A Oh, it would be with us, yeah, that is
our problem.

Q Would it be discussed in the framework
that we have talked about earlier this morning, of
the ultimate origins and the secondary causality?

A Well, in discussing that problem, that


would come up possibly in religion and science, much
the way I have specified it. It would certainly come
up if you were teaching a course in Christian doctrine
of Creation and Christian doctrine of God. I would
expect it would come up in the Jewish doctrine of God,
although I am not an expert on that. It would come
up in many, many contents. One of the first things
to do would be to make this distinction because it
has been made historically, as I say, and because it is
a useful way to think about the whole matter. And
there are many things to be said about the idea of
Creation; all kinds of things to be said. But that
certainly is one of them. Let me say that in teaching
something, in teaching your own views, which we do
occasionally, one is involved, of course, in teaching
one's own view. And one's own perspective, so to
speak, is out there in the center of the table. That
is what we are talking about.

In teaching someone else's view, at least
I try to recede at that point. Now, you don't ever.
I suppose that is true in studying law, too, the
petticoat of any professor shows. I think that
religious studies are probably more aware of the
problem of the petticoat than the social scientist, so


that is a speculative matter. But we are very aware
of it.

I am a Protestant teaching Catholic
thoughts, a Christian may be teaching Buddhist thoughts,
as I used to do in college. One perspective is
out in the center in teaching a course of one's own
thought. One's perspective should, I think, take a
back seat, though obviously to be there teaching, say,
Calvin or teaching liberalism. I don't regard myself
as a theological liberal. But in teaching them, I
would try to teach the way that person would. I think
this is the way you ought to do in being a teacher,
whatever you are teaching. So in teaching someone
who is not a Christian, I try to get inside them and
give it the same power that they would.

Q You said you didn't consider yourself a
theological liberal?

A That's correct, in the sense that I hope
I have the liberal spirit, but, no, I was raised in
the middle of the Twentieth Century when Hitler was
astride Europe and the optimism of liberal theology
seemed to be incredible.

Q How would you characterize liberal

A Well, there in the Twentieth Century, there


was a reaction against liberal theology. I don't
mean a Fundamentalist reaction.

The name of Carl Bart is the great name
in this. In America, the name of Reinhold Niebuhr
is the one who grabbed ahold of me when I was in
college, got me interested. This was a view, what
is called Neo-Orthodoxy or Dialectical, that found
liberal philosophy too optimistic about the goodness
of modern world and the goodness of man and woman
and how we were much better off morally and so forth.
They thought this was not true. They found what
they call the biblical view much truer, that God had
created the world, but something had happened. And
they weren't sure how to talk about what had happened,
but they were sure something had happened. So the
doctrine of original sins comes back, and the doctrine
of revelations, the incarnation, and so forth.

However, they saw fit to teach that way
still within the modern world, and that is what they
were trying to do.

Q As a Neo-Orthodox?

A Yes. The world generally refers to the
great Carl Bart, and there is a significant difference,
I think, between that rather strong Neo-Orthodoxy --
I can define that, but it is getting pretty far up


the road -- and it's milder American cousin, if I
can put it that way, who were represented by, actually
by my two teachers, Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tiller,
who were much less -- I don't know what to say -- had
been influenced more by the modern world. Though
Bart was a very aware man and a very educated man,
there are differences here. If Neo-Orthodoxy refers
to Bart, then I am not a Barty. But I would associ-
ate myself with that whole Twentieth Century movement,
which sought to reinterpret the liberal tradition in
a more biblical direction. They regarded themselves
as biblical theologians, which is stepping from the
biblical views. But they, in various ways, thought
to show this view is not unethical; in fact, it
understands the developments better than the liberals
did, who were too optimistic.

Q What are the characteristics of Neo-
Orthodoxy, besides what you have just mentioned about
the return to the Bible?

A There is a good deal of variety among
them. The European varieties, they have varieties
among them; the American and English varieties are
different, too. But I would say that the first thing
that would come to mind was a much more sober -- you
say sober when you think it is true and you say


pessimistic when you think it is not true -- I will
say sober view of history as not a simple progress
into better and better worlds, more and more secure

The First World War did this for Europe,
and the Second World War and the atomic bomb have done
it for American consciousness. And, therefore, it is
a much more sober view of history, sober view of
human reality and human beings, that they are not as
good as they would like to think they are, that some-
thing was wrong with the world and the way we behaved.
We try to be good, but we end up not being good,
and so therefore, they fall; the symbol of the fall,
a very meaningful symbol, by which to work. By
"symbol," I don't mean not true.

Then emphasize revelation much more,
which is something not to be found in ordinary
experience, but is manifested by God. They are inclined
not to be as exclusive as their orthodox great
grandfathers about this concept. But nevertheless,
this is the center of their theology. That is true
of all of them. This isn't a matter of science or
philosophy, but on which Christian community is founded.
They would regard the Scripture as revelation or as
witnessing the revelation or containing revelation.


Now, there are some real differences
between orthodoxy and Neo-Orthodoxy at these points.
But the transcendence of God, creation out of nothing,
the fall, revelation, incarnation, so forth, all of
these symbols, they would regard essential to
theology and seek to reinterpret them. That is what
they have been about. That is what my own book is
about. My first book was on the doctrine of Creation,
what does it mean in a modern setting. Another book
was on the doctrine of the church. My recent big
book was on the doctrine of providence, what does that
mean in modern science.

Q Would one of the splits between orthodoxy
and Neo-Orthodoxy involve a literal interpretation
of the Bible?

A (Witness nods head affirmatively.)

MR. SIANO: You have to answer

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Yes, yes.
And that would be probably, if not the
essential theological issue, essential
methological issue that they would be
arguing. Now, they might also be arguing
about a lot of other things; predestina-
tion, maybe, and so forth. I don't mean


to confine it to that, but that would be
the essential methodological, how do we
know, kind of question.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) If you are --

A I am not expert on this, but let me just
say that I am not trying to put the orthodox world
all into one.

Q I understand.

A There are large differences between
Lutheran orthodoxy in Europe, Litheran orthodoxy in
St. Louis, let's say, Baptist orthodoxy, Church of
Christ orthodoxy. There are real differences here,
or Reformed orthodoxy in Michigan. So one can't put
them all in the same category. And I wouldn't want
to be on the record as doing that.

Q How does a Neo-Orthodox view the Bible?
I understand you mentioned a moment ago about
revelation. Does does that differ from literalism?

MR. SIANO: There are a lot of
very significant terms in that question,
Mr. Campbell. And I would suggest that
you might want to define a few or limit
a few in the context of your question.
On that basis, I object.

MR. CAMPBELL: I wish I could define


some of those.

MR. SIANO: You are sort of left
with the answer as it comes, without any
qualification or definition. I just offer
that by way of an objection.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) What is biblical

A As I interpret the term, it is the belief
that as an aspect of revelation, they would not
wish to confine revelation to this, but as an aspect
of it, there is -- and I am using their word -- a
dictation of the words of the Scripture by the Holy
Spirit. So that words of the Scripture are literally
infallible, every one of them. This is comparable,
I might say, to the view of the infallibility of the
Pope. It sets the infallibility in another place.

Now, there are wide varieties in the Neo-
Orthodox way of dealing with this question. And it
is hard to characterize it all in a few sentences. I
would say their view would be that the main center
of Revelation is not in the book, but in the event
to which the book witnesses. And these would be the
events, whatever they were, in which Israel was
formed, called, chosen, covenanted; that would be
very important. And in a way, they would affirm, and


I would, too, God was present in that community in a
quite extraordinary way. It doesn't mean God wasn't
present in China. I want to be clear about that point.
He creates and preserves. I would say the other
religions witnessed to him in their own way.

If one believes in God, one can't have Him
only in a particular place, but nevertheless, present
in an unusual way, in a special way. And therefore,
there is the prophetic word. Anybody who seeks to
figure out what went on with Amos ought not to press
too closely. I don't think they know. But Amos
heard the word of the Lord. This would be recorded
in some sense, maybe not all the literal meanings, but
in some sense, the judgment on Israel and that calls
to repentence the word of the Lord.

Now, the sensoral event, for a Christian,
not a Jewish -- Jewish is quite close to this, but
needless to say, it stops -- would be the event of
Christ. This was witnessed in one way by Mark and in
another way by Matthew and another way by John and
another by Paul. All of these were the ways in which
inspired, yes, inspired to call him to Christ. But
writing it down as human beings, one has differences
in the story. Now, that is witnessing to an event
of Revelation, which is, of course, what it means to


be a Christian. This is not something you can prove,
not something you can witness to, and you can say it
makes sense to the world and so forth and so on.
And I would argue that. If anybody said, can you
prove it, the answer would be, of course not, not
any more than the Jewish person can prove to me that
Israel was called and so forth.

I would say what it means to be a
Christian is what it means to be a theologian, as a
member of the community. The Bible, therefore, is
regarded as a witness to Revelation, the authoritative
witness, the closest one, that which continues to
communicate to us this. And secondly, there would be
the belief that God in some way speaks through these
words to you and to me. They are not ordinary words.
If I read it in faith, that is different from reading
it in scholarship, reading in faith, as it is done in
church, as I preach from it, or as I do it personally.
And the word comes to us. Now, that is a kind of a
general statement.

Q I understand. I think what you are really
saying is that -- and I don't want to improperly
characterize what you have told me, either --

MR. SIANO: I suggest you ask a
question and not characterize.


Q (By Mr. Campbell) All right. The
event of Creation occurred to the Neo-Orthodox. The
methodology is not spelled out in the Bible, is what
we are saying; is that correct?

A God's methodology, so to speak. My own
view of this would be that the Hebrews were, because
of the Covenant, fully aware that God was the sovereign
Lord. I think this is clear in Amos and clear in the
Psalms. They start there and move out, so to speak.
This is what they knew. The sovereign Lord means
the Creator. One might say that Creation is an
implication of Israelites standing before God. It is
not as if someone had a class in systematic theology.
That is not the way it happens. Actually, the
orthodox view is as if theologians had done the whole
thing. They come later. They organized this.

It is very clear the first thing Israelites
say is, He saved us from Egypt, the Exodus. This is
where it begins. Then there is Abraham. Something is
going on with Abraham. But we know things started
with Exodus. That is the center of the Old Testament.
He who saved us from the pharaoh is the ruler. This
is also absolutely clear in every line of the Old
Testament, it seems to me. This is what we know.

And that means the ruler of those other


tribes, the ruler of Cyrus, the ruler over the
pharaoh, and this means he is the Creator. So this
is a way of praising God, of saying who He is. Now;
they say this in terms of what they knew about the
world. And it is the most powerful statement.

I object very much when this is called
pre-science, early science. I will argue as much with
the scientist on this. This is crazy. This is a more
profound document than Birch and Russell, as far as
I am concerned, more sophisticated. But still, it
is set within what they knew, just as we would set
it within terms of what we know. 1,000 years later
or 500 years later, even the best statement is going
to be looked at differently.

In Genesis, there are accounts about
Israel being the chosen people. Enoch, I believe,
walked with God. Would these be events or would these
be the explanation of some other --

MR. SIANO: Again, as you are aware,
Mr. Campbell, we had not tendered him as
a Bible scholar, per se, to the extent you
are getting into a particular testimony
which is scientific interpretation of the
Bible itself, and I would object to the
inquiry in this area. A philosophical


or theological discussion on this topic,
I am certainly not going to inhibit that.

MR. CAMPBELL: I am speaking from
a theological standpoint.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) As I understand, you
are not being tendered as an expert on the book of
Genesis. I am not trying to limit you to that.
What would the specific story of Enoch walking with
God or the story of Joseph and the coat of many
colors, what would these describe?

MR. SIANO: Again, I think you
ought to try to focus the question under
a particular theorem, to use a layman's
word. Professor Gilkey has been very
forthright in discussing various approaches,
and I think you ought to try to focus
through whose prism you are asking the

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Just from the prism
of theologian or Neo-Orthodox. I mean, obviously,
you have written some articles on Neo-Orthodoxy,
and we have talked about that this morning. But how
would a Neo-Orthodox view --

A There are wide varieties there. Bart
would do it one way. Somebody else would do it another


way. Let me say, until you think about it, you don't
know what you think about it. That should be said.
I don't have a system in my mind, to put a nickel in and
out it comes. I never thought about Enoch.

I think most of us, and I would say, "us,"
including historians, give a lot more credence to
early documents than they used to. That is just a
profane statement. It used to be regarded, they were
all untrue. Now, we don't know about that. And a
lot of the archeology has shown many of these things
that were said. I think it is generally agreed that
one can have different interpretations of some of
those early stories.

And now Joseph, I think, probably has some
real historical background. That is my own opinion.
And some of the earlier ones about Matthew and so
forth, you can have lots of disagreements with what
is going on here, but when you begin to get into the
historical material from Abraham on, you have clearly
memories of a people, preliterate memories of a people
that have gone on for quite a while, that had a good
deal of validity to them. But I am not one. Who
knows just what that is? The important point itself
seems to me, theologically, that these express the ways
in which the Hebrew people saw their own history in


the relationship to God.

Now, let me put it this way: I would say
the details of the history, I don't regard as revealed.
I would say the relationship of God to this people,
interpreting their history, is that that relationship
is given to them by God and thus is revealed in that
sense. Though a relationship is not revealed -- that
is not quite the right word -- let's say God manifested
Himself or herself -- and I would like to say that
for the record, manifested Himself to the Israelite
people. And out of this, they have an entirely
different way of being in the world, a different
way of thinking. This is evidenced throughout the
whole Scriptures. So these stories -- and I don't
mean by that, that they are untrue -- reflect that.

And Abraham is a very Jewish story. At
that point, the whole bit, from beginning to end,
reflects the knowledge of God that that community had.
Now, as I say, my own feeling is that knowledge
really begins somewhere with that Mosaic Covenant,
though something is happening with Abraham.

Q How would you view the flood, the story of
the flood?



A The same way. Now, I don't have any doubt
there were floods in the past, and I think that is a
very profound and true story, it seems to me. Whether
it is a geologically relevant story, I am not that
certain. There, I would have to be a geologist,
as far as I am concerned, and say what kind of evidence
is there. The theological meaning of it is perfectly

Q What is the theological meaning of the

A It has to do with the reality of human
sense with the reality of the Divine judgment on human
sense, and which I firmly believe, although I don't
think when we are talking law we can come in and say
so and so was killed because of the judgment of God.
I don't think a judge would accept that. It was
Bill Jones that killed him. A lawyer doesn't get
away with that. So I would say that the Divine
judgment is very real. The Divine judgment on us
in the Twentieth Century is exceedingly real. And
that's what I say a theologian is seeking to talk about.
I believe the Second World War was the judgment of
God of human sense. The empirical forces of the
world all go together to bring that up. Whatever
happened in the future can also be taught.


There is a religious dimension to everything
as far as I am concerned, because God is there. This
doesn't mean the historian in his or her way, in effect,
they don't mention God, which doesn't mean God isn't
there. That is the key point. So the Noah story
indicate both the judgment of God and the mercy of
God. And it is a story from which one can preach with
great force and vigor and a sense of its validity.
However, I would be clear in what way I thought it
was valid and what way I didn't.

Q How would you view God's judgment on the
Twentieth Century, outside of like World War II. What
other things do you see?

MR. SIANO: Are you asking for a
personal opinion?


MR. SIANO: I am going to object
to that as being irrelevant.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) You may go ahead and

A The World War is not the only tragic
outcome of the Twentieth Century life.

Q What other things would you say?

A You have got your list and I have got
mine. It is a long, long list.

Transcript continued on next page

Deposition of Langdon Gilkey - Page 2


Q Can you give me some examples?

A The judgment of God on the white race is
very real. It is going to be increasingly real.

Q In what respect?

A They will pay for their oppression of the
blacks and of others. This is the Old Testament view.
God appears, as Hosea says, not as a friendly person,
but as a bear or a lion. And in the long run,
radical injustice leads to conflicts and leads to
destruction. My first experience of this was living
in China and seeing the dissolution of the British
Empire and seeing the Japanese reaction to the Empire.
So it wasn't just Hitler. That reaction was frightening.
I was a prisoner, but it was also there because of
the oppressive and arrogant power of the white West,
which the Japanese just couldn't stand. And they
exploded. The Chinese did a little later. Khomeni
is exploding now, not against Christianity, but against
the West.

Now, the instruments of God in the Old
Testament language are not thereby virtuous. And I
take the Old Testament as giving me the best clue
as to what is going on. And I would argue with
someone who would say, no, there are only natural
explanations. Now, you see what I mean by seeking to


recapture the Bible in the modern situation.

Q Using that as a guide to more or less
your own life?

A Not only to my own life, but as a guide
to understanding my world. I would say the same
about nature. You use nature as if it were merely
an objective realm that we can do anything we want
with. It is a child of God. It is made in the image
of God; not as we are, but we can't do that.

Q It rather seems anti-climatic to go back
to your professional associations you are involved
with. But I would like to ask you about those. Those
were not listed with your curriculum vitae. Are you
a member of any professional organizations?

A Yes. I am a member, but not a regular
attendant of the American Theological Society. I
have been a member of the American Academy of Religion,
which is the professional society, like the American
Historical Society. AAA is the professional society
of teachers of religion; and seminars and colleges
and universities and so on. I have been a member of
that. I was vice-president of it. Then I was
President of it. That is the professional association.

Now, I am an elder statesman. That is
the one I have been involved in quite deeply.


Q Do you know if either of those associations
has a position on whether or not Creation Science
should be taught in public schools?

A The American Academy of Religion would
rather die than take a position on such issues, I
suspect. That is to say, we have Hindus, we have Arabs,
A-rabs, as we like to say --

MR. SIANO: Facetiously, of course?

A (Continuing) Right. We have Jews; we
have Christians; we have non-Christians; we have
everything there. We have fundamentalists. If they
wish to join, they do.

Now, an issue of academic freedom would be
a professional issue. I don't wish to relate these
two. I am not an expert on that. I am not speaking
as an expert. I can well imagine issues of academic
freedom being of interest to the American Academy of
Religion. Any substantiative issue they would steer
clear of for obvious reasons. This is an academy of
teachers; therefore, of all kinds of varieties, and it
is possible only if it takes no particular tradition,
no particular position. I don't think they would agree
to take a position.

Insofar as it might be a constitutional
issue or an issue of academic freedom, they might well,


but not on the substantiative issue.

Q Do you know if they have taken an issue,
either of those organizations?

A No. No, I don't. I meay be wrong about
that. I don't know of it. I am speculating about it.

Q Are you familiar with the organization
called the Society for the Study of Evolution?

A No.

Q Are you a member of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science?

A No, I am not a member. I have been in
touch with them. I have been invited on, I believe,
two occasions, to attend their meetings, because
I have been interested in religion and science. I
went to the Copernicus Festival, whenever that was,
in '76 or something. I am invited to view a speaker
at their meeting next January, in which they are
dealing with the issue that is the substance of our
issue. And I am asked to address a paper, which I
have not written yet, on the subject of inquiry and
beliefs in America. So I have a folder in there of
letters in which this arrangement has been made and
what I am to talk about, who else is on the program,
and so forth and so on.

Q You mentioned academic freedom. I know


you are not an expert on academic freedom and you are
not going to be talking about that at the trial, but
do you personally view Creation Science as an issue
of academic freedom?

MR. SIANO: Again, Mr. Campbell,
I would ask that you select a definition
of the term "Creation Science."

MR. CAMPBELL: I am always referring
to the definition, the only definition I
know of, which is in Section 4A of the
Act 590 of 1981.

MR. SIANO: I am more than happy,
on behalf of the Plaintiff, to accept
that definition.

A (Continuing) My own view is that it is
quite appropriate to teach that in a course on
comparative world view. In fact, I wish there were
such a course. I think its proper place is in the
course that would include philosophical views, among
them, naturalistic and atheism. I think that is where
it is. I don't think it is science. I don't think
it belongs in the scientific classroom. That isn't
an issue of academic freedom. That is another issue.
This is perhaps a constitutional issue of what is
science and what is not.


Now, for my own view, what is science is
determined by the scientific community. As far as
I am concerned, they are the only ones to tell us this.
Just as I would assume the lawyers would want to say
what is the law, what is included there, it's something
we, not anybody else, can say. I would say the same
about the doctors. When one gets to doctors, this gets
interesting, because my wife would disagree that they
knew anything about health. I am not saying these
are the socially, legally, practically ways we can
define these things, and the only way. It doesn't
mean necessarily they are right. I want to be clear
on that. But I don't know any other way to define
what is the subject of law besides the concensus of
the legal community, including its philosophers and
so forth, historians and so forth. I wouldn't want
us to say what the law is. In this way, I think it
is dangerous academically for anybody to tell the
scientific community what they should be teaching.

I think it is dangerous in many ways that
we would spell out, just as I think that the legislature
shouldn't tell the political scientists what to be
teaching, or the sociologists or the psychologists. I
can well imagine the legislature saying you shouldn't
teach Freud. That is very easy to consider. So I


think there is an academic freedom issue here. And I
would be very edge about any act on the part of a
legislature that declared to a profession what its
subject matter was and what its limits were. This,
it seems to me, is precisely what happened in Russia,
to the great detriment of Russian science. This is
precisely what happened in Germany. German science
is tough, and it can survive anything. But that was
too tough. So that is where the issue of academic
freedom will arise, as far as I am concerned.

Q If a scientist -- this is a hypothetical
question -- felt that there was some evidence to support
Creation Science as it is spelled out in Act 590,
do you think that he should be free to discuss that
in the classroom?

A Of course. Of course. I don't have any
question about that. And the only adjudicating
supporters are his or her peers. Now, they are not
in the classroom, but the principle. I would say the
same about a teacher of law.

I believe that, and I think that is part of
science, that one should be quite open to new
interpretations. Now, we can discuss whether this is
possibly scientific, and I am willing to state my
opinion on that, though not as a philosopher of science.


MR. SIANO: And not as a scientist.

A (Continuing) Not as a scientist, correct.
But let's leave that one out. I agree with that
thoroughly, absolutely.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Would you also agree
that the legislature should not prohibit some area
from being discussed in the classroom? Just as we
talked about it mandating the teaching of something
to a professional, would it likewise follow that it
should not prohibit --

A I am not quite sure what that means.

MR. SIANO: Also, I object. I am
going to object to the question as calling
for a legal conclusion and being speculative.
I am not going to let you get very far into
this area.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) What I am thinking of
is in terms of teaching, you indicated, I think, you
found it offensive or whatever that the legislature
would mandate to a professional that he should present
something in the classroom?

A Right.

Q Likewise, would you find it offensive if
the legislature prohibited a professional from bringing
something in the classroom?


MR. SIANO: Again I am going to object
to the question. You are asking a different
question, which is intrinsically a legal

MR. CAMPBELL: I am asking him as a
person, not as a lawyer.

MR. SIANO: As a person, his opinion
is not relevant. It is not in his area of
expertise and not relevant to the case. It
is very far afield. There are limits. There
is in fact a limit to what you are allowed
to inquire, when you tread upon an area
in which I am compelled to direct him not
to answer, when you go so far afield.

MR. CAMPBELL: Are you instructing him
not to answer that question?

MR. SIANO: No. I am suggesting to
you, I think you ought to get into some area
that is at least collaborately relevant.

MR. CAMPBELL: May he be permitted to
answer that question?

MR. SIANO: Yes. I told you that.

A (Continuing) I can't conceive of what
you are thinking about. I couldn't have an opinion
as to what you are thinking about. If you can,


formulate that into an example of prohibiting something.
I have already indicated that I think a scientist
who generally feels that something is scientific --
now he may be wrong -- obviously -- but I approve
of his being able to teach what he or she feels to be
scientific. I think they would be obligated to teach
what the concensus of the scientific community is, and
then say, well, my own view is this. I would be quite
content with that. If the legislature said this is out
of bounds, I can't conceive of such a law. I don't know
what such a law would look like. Anyway, I am a baby

Q (By Mr. Campbell) This is not a major
point at all. The thing is, I was wondering, just
like the legislature having mandate here in the
teaching of creation science, what if they made a
law prohibiting the teaching of Creation Science in
this country?

A The principle would be, they would then
say it is a science. And I would disapprove of that.
A more possible example is, say, if you have a college
faculty in political theory and they want someone to
teach Marxism, and the legislature says you can't,
I would say that is wrong in principle. We should know
what Marxism is. This is something that should be


before us. I would go against any prohibition of that
sort. Let me say that in relation to this, that the
verb "to teach," is a very ambiguous word. I interpret
that as I said, to show the class how to think about
this idea. To many people, to teach means to instruct
this is true. And I think the issue of academic
freedom, the issue of the freedom to explore various
ideas, is based upon the first meaning of the words
"to teach," and not the second. So that the way the
sentence is, to you approve of so-and-so being taught,
actually the sentence has got to be unpacked.

My own view is that it is the scientific
attitude that there are few things that, in the
classroom, should be taught in the second meaning of
the word, and that everything should be taught in
the first meaning of the word. That is the way I
would interpret academic freedom.

Now, in the issue of religion, this is
particularly warm. I think they should all be taught.
I think none of them should be taught in the second,
in a classroom. You can hardly grade people in piety
on a final exam.

Q We have talked about this earlier, but can
you tell me how you personally viewed the creation of
the universe and man and life?


MR. SIANO: Wait a minute. Now, you
are not asking for his professional opinion.
You are asking for his personal view?


MR. SIANO: I am going to object on
the grounds of relevance. But I will let
him answer the question.

A (Continuing) Let me first of all say my
first book was on that subject. It is before the
court. I think I have expressed this, that I believe
everything came into being through the work of God.
This is the way I interpret the first chapter of
Genesis, the first verse of Genesis. As a theologian,
I don't know how that process took place. Just as a
theologian, I don't know what the neurological structure
of my body is. We found out a lot of things. I am
interested in various people who know much more about
these things telling me how that took place. In other
words, my own interpretation of theology is that it
has to do with God and God's activities, with primary
causality and not with the detailed structure of
secondary causality. Now, the theological question
is, what does it mean to say God is our creator? Does
it mean about the world? Certainly. Certainly that
it is good, as the Bible says; that it has a meaning;


that its history is headed somewhere. I am not exactly
sure there, but that is a firm belief, that we are
sent here for a purpose. We are more than animals.
Though, I don't think it is bad to be an animal.
I object to some of the literature where animals
are regarded as somehow dirty. In many respects,
they are cleaner than we are. I wish we were as
virtuous as the animals. That is part of our faith.
I don't like the cover of that thing (indicating).
It has the ape looking down. An ape can well look
down on us. They haven't extinguished the earth;
we may have. It indicates to me that we have a
certain responsibility to be related to god, to be
related to our neighbor in a certain way. This
is the first and second Commandment. This is what
we are here for, and so on and so forth.

So the concept of God's creation of the
world and us, let me put it that way, has almost an
infinite meaning. In fact, it says you spell it out,
what you are doing is spelling out the whole Christian
faith. Now, actually, if you start anywhere, you
spell out the whole thing. Systematic theology is,
you start and say God is the creator and so on and
so forth. I suppose it is like the law. Things
relate to one another. If I went on with what it means


to me, I would run through everything. I think I have
said enough.



Q Have you ever testified before in a
court of law?

A I've done this once.

MR. SIANO: What is "this"?

THE WITNESS: This deposition. Not
in a court of law, that is to say.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) What was the circum-
stance of that --

A Well, I'm a member of the Committee for
the Study of the New Religions, which appropriately
it meets inadvertently, because I'm an expert, I
suppose, and I'm also interested in the subject.
And apparently, as a member of that committee, my name
gets given to groups who wish one form of testimony
or another. There may be other types of testimony,
but I don't know what they are. But mine was, in this
case, to testify that a group was, in fact, a religion.
And I agreed to do this after looking at the group.
It was called the Gurdyaev, G-u-r-d-y-a-e-v. I had
never heard of it before. It shows I didn't --
wasn't as much of an expert as I thought.

It's a small group founded by a Russian
at the end of the Nineteenth Century, which is kind of
a mixture of Russian Orthodoxy and Sufism and Hindu --
well, we don't need to go into that. And they wanted


me to testify they were a religion.

I read their stuff. I went down and met
with them a couple of times.

The point was, they had bought property,
and they wanted -- it wasn't for a store; it was for
their meetings. They wanted to be set under the tax
laws of governing religions, churches. And there was
no question they were a religious group. I had to
define religion in the process, and I think I convinced
them this was a religion.

The fellow lawyer said, but they don't
meet on either Saturday or Sunday. Now, he was Jewish,
and I thought that was a marvelous expression from an
American legal view of religion. Thursday is out.

And so we had a long talk about what
religion was and how not everybody met on either
Saturday or Sunday, and so on. So that was --
that was what it was.

Q I was going to ask you later on, but we
are already here. But how would you define religion?

A Well, I'm an expert, but no definition is
universally agreed to. My own definition is that
anything to be called a religion must include, first,
a view of the ultimate reality, what is really real,
and our discussion will indicate why I say -- have that




ethic, a law, a set of rules. But unless, in moving
into it, you change the way you're existing or at
least say you're going to, you don't have this.

Now, whether the people in a given religion
really do what they're saying is an interesting
question; but still, they would say, we believe in
this, that, and the other; this is what we follow.
All right?

Okay. And in that way of life, there is
included some way of coming into touch with that
reality. It's not just an ethical society; right?

Now, some will call that worship; some
will call it meditation; some will do it through what
we would call cultic practices; right? I mean, there's
a tremendous variety. But along with the way of life
is -- as a part of it, there is, you may say, regular
-- almost regularized within a particular tradition,
a way of associating one's self with this reality.

It's very hard to be more specific, because
the minute you are, you leave somebody out; right?

Okay. Thirdly, there is a community --
church, you would say, people. As in Judaism, there
is a community with a -- some form of definite
structure, some mode of authority, some designation
of tasks -- well, so on and so forth -- that meets at


specified times and places in certain ways, and so
forth and so on. Without that, I don't think you
can have a religion.

Now, we can go on explicating each of
these three and believe me, I would say there's nothing
people disagree with as much as definitions of religion;
but I think that's a pretty good one.

MR. SIANO: Can we take a short


MR. SIANO: Thank you.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was

MR. CAMPBELL: Professor Gilkey,
if you want to stop again, that's no
problem. We've been going for quite a
while. I'm sorry I didn't notice.

THE WITNESS: That's all right.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) You've been listed
by the Plaintiffs as a witness in the case, and
obviously, the main part of my inquiry today is going
to be directed toward determining what it is that
you're going to testify to and the source of those
opinions, the reasons for those opinions. So can you
tell me, if you have thought it out, generally what


the subject matter of your testimony will be at

A Well, if I were to choose how it would
develop, it would develop this way; that we would
begin just as you did, with a definition of religion,
and then I would narrow that to the relevant point
of what is religion in our historical tradition,
which is almost exclusively, though not quite, formed
by the Jewish and the Christian, to some moderate
extent, the Islamic traditions, but one could say
it's -- as the Islamic people say -- the people of
the Book. This wasn't always true in the West,
obviously, but it is now. It's been that way since

Now, in such a religions context, that
first point of the definition of ultimate reality, of
course, takes a particular form -- God. That is to
say, God is the center of all religion. Religion has
to do with God; God is what religion is about. That's
the functional meaning of monotheism. There's nothing
else religious but God.

However, we stray from that. That's the
point. So that in our tradition, religion and God
are, in our common sense, in our assumptions, in
everything, directly associated.


This was the problem legally with that
little group -- how could they be religious without
God, you see? Well, that makes sense in Chicago.
It wouldn't make any sense in Tokyo, but we're here.

So then I would go on and talk about the
meaning of monotheism, which means that when you
speak of God, you're speaking religiously. When you
speak of the world, you're not -- you could be
speaking religiously if you speak of the world in
relation to God; but whenever you're speaking of God,
you're speaking religiously. Whatever you're talking
about with God, whether one's talking about Creator,
Revealer, Redeemer, Judge, Savior -- you see what we
mean by "monotheism"? Every one of those subjects
relates to God.

Thus, one could say religion has to do
with God, and whatever has to do with God is part of
religion. This includes not only ways of behaving,
worship -- we aren't worshipping anything else; we're
worshipping God there in a Christian or Jewish context
or Islamic.

It also includes language, prophesies,
theologies, if you will -- theology, perhaps, is a
little more confined; but language compositions.
God did so-and-so; God spoke to me; God is going to do


so-and-so for you -- these are all religious proposi-

Now, I would go on to say that among the
religious propositions that are most religious in
that sense is the statement, God created the world.
Now, I mean, "most religious" not in the sense that
emotively, that is religious, but in the sense of
the Jewish definition of Creation. God's the only
actor; right? That's what ex nelio means.

God is presumably the main actor; but
after all, in the orthodox view, Mary is also there,
and so forth and so on; right? So even with salvation,
we're also there.

At this point, nothing's there. So one
could say ex nelio is of all statements, the most;
those others are religious.

The fact it has to do with nature doesn't
mean it's not religious. It's a religious view of
nature. Always has been taken to be that.

In the sense appropriately, it is the
first chapter of Genesis, though, as I said, my own
view is that this is not the first thing known.
That is to say, the calling of Israel begins the
story, as far as I'm concerned, all right? And then
they know that the God who called them is the Creator.


But logically, it comes out this way, obviously, and
it's not only the first chapter of Genesis, but it's
the first article of the Christian creed, the so-called
Apostle's Creed.

I'll say "so-called" not in terms of doubt;
but as far as we know historically, this appears about
150. But it's about as early as you can get, the
first document and, after all, the first chapter,
John, and so forth.

But I wanted to say to creed, because this
is quite right. I believe the God Almighty in Heaven
and Maker of this Earth when they want to say, who
are we, what do we believe, what is our world like,
how do we view everything. This is the first thing
they say, and rightly. So this is a religious

It's also a peculiarly Christian statement.
Now, it's also Jewish, though the Jews are not so
much interested in doctrine, and they get kind of
bored when we start talking about ex nelio and so
forth. But I haven't found any of them who really
want to disagree with this one; that is, this Creation
out of nothing.

It's peculiarly that. It's not Hindu.
They have a different view of Creation. In fact, they


wouldn't even want to use the word. It's not Greek
in the sense of Greek religions or Greek philosophical.
It's not Babylonian, and so on and so forth. You name
it, it's not.

There are all kinds of religious creation.
This is peculiarly Christian, and when I talk to
Buddhists, they object to this one just the way
Birch and Russell would object to this one. Different
grounds, but they don't believe it. So it's a religi-
ous doctrine, and it's a peculiar religious doctrine.

Thirdly, it's a particular interpretation
of that religious doctrine. That is, the Creation's
interpretations, it's not mine; apparently, it's not
the Jewish interpretation; and I'll suspect that's
what the other churches who are involved say, that
is, who are among the Plaintiffs. So I will testify
this is a particular interpretation of a very particular
religious point of view.

Then I was going to talk as a theologist,
not as an expert,about the difference between religion
and science, at least with regard to what their
propositions involve; right -- or their theories
involve. What is a religious theory? What is a
scientific theory?

Now, I'm not an expert on science, as I'm


not paid to be a philosopher of science; so the
weight of my testimony is a little bit unbalanced
there. But I do know something about it and can make
the distinction, and I will try to do that.



Q Is there anything else that you might
testify on?

A No. Just to make that quite concrete,
I would say, as a conclusion to these views, that the
establishment of a religious point of view, which I
take it to be, because it has to do with God. God
is the main actor here. If you take God out, there
isn't even theory; there's no model. It's the
establishment of a religious point of view in the
act as it appeared -- this, again, being the first

Now, that's obvious in what I've been
saying, but I just wanted to make that clear.

MR. SIANO: Off the record.

(An off-the-record discussion ensued.)

A (Continuing) Yes. Involved in this
testimony is the question, what is apologetics, which,
as you probably know, has been an effect of -- I
don't think the word is used in any other tradition.
Of the Christian tradition or Christian theological
tradition has been an enterprise called apologetics.
Now, that enterprise has been distinguished rightly
or wrongly. Someone might say, the systematic
theological enterprise, which would be expounding the
Christian faith.


Apologetics is distinguished from that in
terms of an argument for the validity of the Christian
faith. And there are many apologetic documents; but
probably the most famous is St. Thomas' summa contra
gentiles; that is to say, the summa, the compendium
of geology against the gentiles, an argument to those
outside for a religious position.

In this sense, apologetic doesn't assume
the faith at the beginning, assume the authority or
either Scripture or church, of dogma; but finds some
common ground, the world we live in, morality,
community, or what we know about nature, let's say --
I don't want to say "science," because that doesn't
apply, say, to the Thirteenth Century or to the
Fourteenth Century, whatever. And there are many
documents from the earlier church arguing against
Roman philosophers. There were a group of early
Christian thinkers called the apologies -- exactly
this, arguing with the Roman world.

You mind a common ground, and you argue.
You argue for a particular religious tradition; that's
what apologetics is. St. Thomas is the most famous
example, but there are many others. William Pehli,
the famous formulator of the Divine argument at the
end of the Eighteenth Century, who, incidentally,


by heart, as a theological student, memorized the
arguments from God of the design of the world. Another
one that comes to mind is F. R. Tenant, an English
philosopher of religion in the Twenties who argued
from the facts of evolution to the necessity of a

I would argue that Creation Science is
an act of apologetics. That is to say, it has a
model derived from the religious tradition which it
seeks to show is true by appealing to the scientific
facts, and so forth and so on. And it's an argument
for a -- as I say, a particular position and a particular
interpretation of a particular religious position.
But there's -- in my mind, there's no question it is
an apologetic effort.

Q In defining religion, what authorities
will you be relying on to make your conclusions as to
what is religion?

MR. SIANO: Do you understand the

A (Continuing) I'm going to rephrase it.
What sources.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) What sources.

A All right. Because "authority" has got
the wrong nuances. The main sources would be what


study of religions I've been involved in. Now, at
that point, I am on the boundary of expertise; however,
it's my job as an expert to think about religion,
and I know a great deal about various religions.
I've taught them and I've read about them, and so
forth, and there, of course, as I say, a hundred
definitions of religion. But this one is the one
that I have -- and I've checked it with others -- that
seems to me to tell us what this is.

Among all the various other things humans
do, religion is an abstraction. It's not as if it's
there any more than economics is there; it's an
abstraction from the totality of life. It seeks to
be the center of life, but it's an abstraction. And
there's also economics, politics, and so forth and
so on. And it's perfectly true that if you went to
an archaic society -- I'm thinking of a Babylonian
society, Egyptian society -- you would be absolutely --
it would be impossible to distinguish religion from
politics, from economics, and so forth and so on.
In that sense, it's very much of an abstraction.

And what we call religion was the center
of the society. One of the things that's happened
in the development of civilization has been these
things that divide it off. Law is different from --


well, I don't need to explain. That's -- and what
happened -- has happened with the Constitution of
the United States, but happens spiritually with the
development of the enlightenment -- I mean, in terms
of people's mind is that the community is not founded
upon its religion, but founded upon what we like
to call a natural basis.

Now, the legal separation of church and
faith is merely an expursion.



The religion is a part of life, but
not center. So one has to look for one's sources of
a definition of religion to all kinds of situations
where it has different ways of functioning in a
human community. And I think that what I was des-
cribing is able not only to cover the varieties --
well, for something like Buddhism, early Buddhism is
clearly an old religion, because there's no question
that the early Buddhists were religious and had no
deity. And there are those things that seemed to
follow up the community where you have a theology,
in effect, or a Roman society, or indistinguishable
from political, or in our society, which was Christian
for a long time, where you have a different relation-
ship where it's absolutely in the center of the
Christian King, the Holy Roman Empire, and so on and
so forth, and in our society where you've got the
Methodists, let's say, with very strange relations to
Washington. And so those are the sources.

Q The ultimate reality which you talked
about sounds a lot like Paul Tiller with his --
was it ultimate concern? Was that what he taught?

A No. Ultimate concern is a psychological
category. Ultimate concern is my relation to ultimate
reality, but that's a psychological category. No.


The unexamined, the patillic (sic) God is the object
of my ultimate concern. Got is not my ultimate
concern; my ultimate concern could be for cash.
Then one could say, this is my God, but God is not my
ultimate concern in that -- in the sense of logical
identity. Until its category of the unconditional,
the grounds of power and meaning is equivalent to the
word God.

No. I was thinking of some word, but
even the word "reality" is dubious there, because
after all, your Buddhist friends would say no, it's
not reality; it's nothingness. But if you joggle them
a little bit, you say, well, I'm using the word
"reality" to cover your nothingness, whatever that
is' and he'll say, okay. But that itself is not a
-- I think you can see the problem.

Whatever language you use to point to that
which religion or its culture takes to be ultimately
real, you try to get some neutral word there that
will cover that.

Now, this will be the subject of its
doctrines. This is the prime -- I don't know of any
religion which doesn't relate itself to what it
thinks to be real. It doesn't believe itself to be
a projection.


Q I see.

A All right? Other people may say that,
but it doesn't say that. That's why I think that
first definition is quite right.

Q Would this definition be held only by
you, or are there others who hold a similar definition?

A When they're taking a test, students
hold it. When they get on their own, I don't know.

Q Did you pick this up from reading any
scholar theologians? I think you mentioned --

A Well, this is a result of all of my
scholarship insofar as it has to do with all of
this subject. I don't -- I feel a little uneasy about
either saying it's somebody else's or trying to put my
name on it.

Q I see.

A If asked, what do you call religion, I
don't know -- and one can be asked this in many contexts.
This is precisely what I was asked in that other
deposition. Then this is what I would answer.

It has the authority not of my name, but
of the fact that it makes sense with regard to the
data. And anything like this is a proposal. It doesn't
come from God, and I want to make that clear. I don't
think that it does. But I'd be willing to argue for


it with anybody.

Q Which scholar theologians have most
influenced your thinking?

A When I wrote my last large book on the
theology of history, I dedicated it to Ryan O'Neal and
Paul Tiller, saying that they had been my teachers,
they were both my teachers and friends, and that
anybody who read my stuff could see them in it. They
said that they disagreed and regarding an antithesis,
since every sentence of mine reflected both of them,
I didn't agree with that point. I was either bringing
them together or was wildly confused, and I wasn't
ever sure which. So that's the main source.

If one goes back a little further, I would
say St. Augustine, Lutheran Calvin, and Schliermacher.

Q You want to spell Schliermacher for the

A S-c-h-l-i-e-r-m-a-c-h-e-r.

Q You stated that it was your opinion that
God is the center of all religion. If I said some-
thing wrong, please let me know. I don't want to
mischaracterize your statement.

MR. SIANO: I would object to the
characterization. Again, I think we have
a great deal of difficulty in the area of


sophistication to have either you or I
try to characterize his testimony. But
my understanding was that the concert to
the deity was what was focused on. You
know, I'm not trying to characterize,
either, and I don't want --

MR. CAMPBELL: I understand.

THE WITNESS: Let me respond to that
question. I won't answer it, but I'll
respond to it. There are various ways of
talking in this field. When you asked me
for a definition, I was giving a descrip-
tive historical, in careful quote,
scientific -- careful quote, scientific
description, which sought not to give a
view of the world, but to say, what's this
stuff we see all around us, what we named
by common usage, religion. Okay?

Now, there's a -- quite a different
question which is a much more interesting
one to me. What do you think there is in
reality that explains why people are

Now, obviously one is they're showing
one's own petticoat. This is where you


begin to develop a world view. And many
people looking at religion, just the way
you and I might, would say, this is all a
projection. This would be Floyd, this would
be Marks, this would be even Darwin. I would
say they don't make sense, but that can't be
a scientific statement. That's a philosophi-
cal or a theological explanation. But let's
leave that aside.

If you ask me as a theologian something,
then you get what you said. This is a
response to God, and I would thoroughly agree
with that; but that would not be my defini-
tion of religion. It would be my theological
statement, which would seek to include --
in explaining all kinds of things, to
include, why is there human religion? Why
is it when you get to the earlier tribes,
you find a sense of the holy, you find a
holy fear, you find a celebration of some
kind of gift -- all these things, because,
I would say, they're living in the presence
of God. But if I said this for the Society
of the Study of Religion, they would just
say, this is typical, and they have their


own view, and et cetera, et cetera.

That's a theological interpretation
of religion, which is quite different than
a definition of religion in a court of law.
But if you, in court, ask me, all right, you,
as a theologian, how do you explain it?
Then we'd get talking this way. But one's
got to make some pretty careful distinctions
as to how the witness is talking here.
I think that's -- anyway, so you were not
wrong in what you said. We just got a --
said it in the right context.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) With regard to mono-
theism and with regard to religion in our historical
tradition -- and I assume by "our," you're referring
to -- let me ask you. What are you referring to when
you said, "our historical tradition"?

A that of the European and American West.
Australia, New Zealand -- you name it. But that
which seems out of the Jewish tradition, the Greek or
Roman tradition, which come together. In both the
Jewish and the Christian tradition, subsequently,
the Jewish thought reflects this as well as Christian
thought, this union. It comes down through the
medieval period, goes through the renaissance and


reformation, the enlightenment, into maternity, so
to speak, what we generally call West with a capital
"W", that's what I mean.

Now, more specifically with regard to our
religious tradition, which is a part of that -- I
don't know what sentence we were talking about. I
would be referring to the Catholic, and then the
Protestant traditions in the West. The eastern
tradition -- I mean, eastern orthodox tradition is
different in many ways, and I'm really not an expert
at all on that.

Q Accepting that definition which you've
just given in terms of the American -- excuse me --
European and American West --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and then, more specifically, Catholic
and Protestant position of the West, is it your opinion
that the word "Creator" is an inherently religious

A With a capital "C"; yes. Now, obviously,
"Who's the creator of that statute" is not a religious
statement or a question. "Who's the Creator of
the world" is. And that goes beyond monotheism. That
is, that the myths of Creation of other -- by "myth"
I don't mean untrue; but the myths of the religions


used may or may not use the word "Creator"; they
don't mean what we mean by it. But they may use the
word "Creator," and in that sense, it's religious.
There's no way of getting around that one.

Q Would that be true, then, of any word
which sought to describe the ultimate origin of the

MR. SIANO: You've got to define
"the world" for me.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Well, the universe,
or however -- we've been talking about origins. In
other words, at any time that you've talked about
origins, regardless of whatever word you used --
creator, designer -- would it have an inherent
religious --

A That's a tricky and subtle matter. In the
history of philosophy, there have been a number of
ways of talking this way. Usually, they begin with
something there. In that sentence, none of them have
quite the character of ultimate origins we've been
talking about; right? I'm thinking of early Greek

Now, let's say speculative philosophy is
the endeavor to think this out nonreligiously; okay?
Whether the person is religious or not -- Jay Gould


would be a good example. I think one could say
Aristotle. What's interesting is that they're always
reflection the religious tradition of their time in
terms of rational forms. And I think August Comp
was quite right that metaphysics is a rational form
of religious condition. I think Comp couldn't have
been wronger that we couldn't get rid of -- well, he
did think, you know, you had to have a cult, you know,
science. But I think he is right about that. Greek
philosophy is a rational form of the religious
attitude of that culture.

So that there are efforts as a society
becomes more -- let's say advanced in "reflective"
to set the religious tradition into religious
philosophical form. Very clear examples of this are
Indian/Hindu philosophy, which set in reflective
form the mystical fundamentals of the religion of
India, Buddhist philosophy and so on. These have
unquestionably a religious space. They express a
religious point of view philosophically, and I will
say, whatever you find, say, St. Thomas, natural
theology, this is Catholic religion expressed philo-
sophically, whatever it wants to call itself, and it's
called natural theology.

Now, at the present time, I think it would


be almost -- that this is a risky statement, but I
think I can make it. There are not many philosophers
who think they can deal with this kind of question.
Say, metaphysics, in this kind of ultimate sense, is
as I've put it, a terminal case in the same award
as theology; that is to say, in the mind of a good
deal of our world, our academic world. And you find
philosophy defining itself in the -- a speculation
in which the question of origin could come up. But
as the philosophy of science, as the analysis of
experience -- now, the minute you say philosophy is
the analysis by reason of experience, you cut out
the question of origin. The question of origin is
excluded. You understand?

So I say the only people who are taught
to raise the question are the theologians at the
present time. Historically, Thomas raised it, but
he had a clerical collar on. The point you're raising
is a tricky one. But I would witness to this. When
you witness to a theological, a philosophical point
of view, you're not subject to perjury, because some-
body may disagree with you, and that should be
clear. I don't want to be caught on that one -- here's
something that doesn't agree with me.

We're dealing with controversial issues


here, and I want to make that clear. I don't wish
to state the truth; I wish to state my view that when
one looks at these, and even the most speculative
efforts to discuss origins, one finds some philoso-
phical expression of religious tradition.

Q So is Creation Science, then, a rational
form of religious tradition?

MR.SIANO: Objection. The question
has been asked and answered already. You
can go ahead and answer it again.
I've just said you already asked the ques-
tion once before.

A (Continuing) Well, the logical form of
it is philosophical or natural theological. That is
to say, they're asking the question, how do we make
sense of certain facts, which is the way a philosopher
might proceed or a theologian arguing a natural
theology. Formally, therefore, this is philosophical.
This is not the way the scientists ask. You don't
just ask, how do you make sense of what is the most
intelligible explanation. In fact, I think I'd say
the history of science have found those kind of things
can end up with everything from apples to bananas.
And there's no way of settling this, how did we make
something out of it.


And one might say, the criteria of ade-
quacy to the facts incoherent which are generally
regarded as the criteria of philosophical ideas.
Now, that's not the way the science is perceived.
And it is, in part, the way the theologian proceeds.
That is to say, I think most of us agree that to be
in accord with the Scripture is our first -- to be
in accord with the Scripture, and that means in
argument that we are, that's our first authority or
requirement or canon. To be in accord with tradition
is the second and subsidiary one.

But what we regard as true in the sciences
is important. And then what's important to me is
adequacy to all the facts of experience, and heaven
knows who has hold of the facts of experience; but
that's part of your argument. And, of course, coherence
among your ideas, if they don't -- aren't coherent,
you better pack up right away. You can't start with
one God and end up with five. So those -- some of
those are philosophical criteria. They're significantly
different as what the scientists would specify as
criteria for the theory, and these have a different
form; and I would say that Creation Science comes in
under that.

Q You mentioned religions that do not have


God as the source of their origins. Do any of those
religions even seek to explain that, explain origins?

A No. Rephrase the question. I'm not sure
-- quite sure what you're asking.

Q These religions that do not have God as
the creator --

A Yeah.

Q -- do they attempt to explain creation, or
do they just start from where they are?

A Well, they wouldn't use the word "creation,"
probably. That's a word pitched inexorably to God.
Without God -- you can't have a creation out of nothing,
because you've got nothing. So they don't explain
creation; they regard that as a Christian myth. And
they're very rough about that. Get talking with the
Buddhist. He thinks we're asinine.

Well, let's take the best example, which
is Theravada Buddhism, which is presumably the
early Buddhism. Here it's very obvious, it seems
to me, to everybody who's read these documents, that
there is no deity figure. In fact, the Buddha said
he wasn't interested in this kind of a problem. The
Hindus had deities and couldn't care less. He did
have -- what, he had four noble truths. My statement
of this will not be in expert form. Involved in them


was the statement, all is in flux, which is pretty
close to my first point, all that is in flux is
suffering, which is involved in that.

What's our big problem? We think we are
real, we think we are a self. We're attached to this,
and, therefore, we suffer in it. The way to get out
-- and, boy, here's the real religious element -- is
to learn detachment from this that we are not a
self; that there's nothing to be attached to here,
to develop this incredible cool; and then finally,
we will not exist any longer, and so forth and so on.

Now, there are four noble truths, and
there is the song, the community, and there is the
way of life, which seems very aesthetic to us, but
was regarded in that Hindu world of about the Fifth
Century, B.C., as being very middle-of-the-road.
Now, to the average guy sleeping in the Holiday Inn,
it's everything but the middle of the road, but
that's -- and it had certain characteristics.

Now, they would certainly not use the
word "creation," in fact, what is is the problem.
That's not Christian. What is is good; what we've
done with it is the problem. But for them, what is
the problem.

You've got a very different view here,


very different view; and this is -- this has always
been going on, and we can get out of it. And you
have certain creation myths in Hinduism, but they
almost always have a deity connected with it of one
sort or another. They're not Creation in our sense,
because the deity either spins the world out of himself
-- which is not the Christian belief. God didn't
spin the world out of Himself. We are not of the
substance of God. Christ is only of the substance of
God. We are made out of nithing, not out of God.
So we are -- this is an utterly different view from
that Hindu myth, when out of Brahman comes the world,
and then goes back to Brahman, and so forth, or
Brahman dreams the world. It's all a dream.

You've got hundreds of different things
that -- but those are not Creation myths.

There are also Indian Creationists. Indra
comes to a foremost matter and creates the world
out of it. He slays Tiobot and takes the world.
But Indra is proceeded by heaven knows how many
hundreds and thousands of deities, and so forth and
so on.

All I'm trying to do is indicate, you've
got very, very different ways of going about this,
and none of them would have the force of our word


"creation," but everybody explains origins in one way
or another, talks about it; right? Everyone talks
about it' right? Even the question of ultimate origins
is Christian.

Q With regard to your testimony concerning
the difference between religion and science --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- you've provided a definition for
religion. How would you define science in that con-

MR. SIANO: You're asking a specula-
tive question, assuming the witness will
define science, and I object to the assump-
tion inherent in the question.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Will you define science
to distinguish it from religion in your testimony
concerning the difference between religion and

A I will certainly say it's something about
the way I understand the way scientists proceed.
The kinds of questions they ask, the kinds of experi-
ences that they appeal to, the kinds of authorities
that they recognize, and the kinds of theories that
can be regarded as scientific, and shows, in each
case, the kinds of questions that are asked, the


kinds of experiences that are appealed to; or one
could put it in kinds of facts that each talks about,
the kinds of authorities that are appealed to, and
the character of the theories are substantially
different between science and religion. That will
be the way my testimony will proceed.

Q How are the kinds of questions that
scientists ask different from the kinds of questions
that religion ask?

A On the whole, the scientist has been
interested in the question, what sort of a process
that can be observed can infect a material process.
A physical process explains events that can be observed.
In this sense, one might say, this is a "how" ques-
tion -- how did it take place. It's not a "why"
question. You can bend "why" around to answer that --
to ask that question, but that's not really what
you mean by "why."

Very early, purposes were regarded as not
a scientific matter -- I say very early -- in the
development of modern science.

What's the purpose of the earth going
around the sun is a kind of typical, what, Greek
semi-religious question when they thought the sun
going around the earth was an in-soul being, and one


might ask, why is it doing it. Because it's a being;
it's a "how" question asking for the material process
and asking for a necessary -- the answer will be a
necessary, as they like now to say, set of variable

Okay. We will say causes and effects.
Modern philosophy of science is a little uneasy about
cause and effect causes. They'd rather be talking
about this if "P" then "Q" kind of stuff. And so
you have a different theory there in terms of it --
the observational canon, because it is interested in
the process of events as they unfold. It recognizes
only secondary causality in terms of our discussion.
It is against the rules to introduce anything else.
Now, I think that's a canon that has been recognized
in every one of these distinctions.

I would suggest also in the law that a
demon killed John Smith is not a legal explanation.
You have a category act of God, but it doesn't function
that way; right? And I'd say the scientist would say
the same; the historian would say the same. If I
were to write a history book, not a theology book --
a history book on the origins of the First World
War -- that's the word, the origins of -- as I say,
I could not include the category, the judgment of God.


Maybe in a footnote; maybe in an addendum; but if I
handed that into the University of Chicago History
Department as a thesis, I'd have a hard time.

Now, to me, that doesn't mean it's untrue,
as I said, but it's simply not historical inquiry --
the rules of historical inquiry.

Now, I would say, with history -- you
don't have a necessary law, I don't think, in history
and that makes it logically different than natural
science. There's a lot of argument about this, as
you may know.

Supernatural cause is uncommon right
across the disciplines. I suppose that's what we
mean by secular discipline. Certainly Academia
recognizes this. That's what they're uneasy about,
our being in Academia. All right?

I think it's important to understand
Darwin wasn't the mean guy you're deduced at this
point. At this point, he was being a scientist. A
doctor is required, as Shrewell said, to find the
natural cause of a disease. He doesn't keep looking
for it. The fact he hasn't found it, whatever he
may believe, that's what his job as a doctor is.

I'd say the same with a lawyer. Now,
that means, scientific theories are really significantly

Transcript continued on next page

Deposition of Langdon Gilkey - Page 3


different than religious theories; right? They func-
tion differently; they ask different questions; they
appeal to different experiences, though they may be

Okay. I can say, the world is a very
orderly place, and that reveals to me the presence
of God or the creativity of God. Generally, in doing
that kind of -- I'm taking it all as a whole; right?
I'm not selecting a particular kind of order. That's
a more specific question. But I can take the same
facts. But I'm asking for the why of them and the
ultimate origin of them in the sense we've used the
word; but also, the "why" is there very deeply in
religious questions. Why is the world as it is? Why
is it good? Why is it so messed up? What's going
to happen to us all? Where are we going? Why are we
here? What are we about?

Now, these are typical very important
questions, I think the most important questions that --
you can look through every science in the world, and
you won't have an answer to any of those things.

Now, let me be clear. When I say this,
I don't mean all scientists would agree with me; right?
But the kinds of experiences they appeal to, the
scientist is truck with shareable experience. And I


don't mean shareable in a revivalist camp meeting or
a Catholic mass; I mean shareable to anybody who is
wiling to look and is able to look -- let's put it
that way. Thus, it's data or objective, I think the
word carries it's own weight here. You can look at
them; he can look at them; I can look at them; repeat-

Now, while there are a wildly different
variety of experiences from which a religious view-
point arises, they certainly aren't shareable in
quite that way. They're not nonpublic because they're
often common. The Catholic mass, that's common; the
Southern Baptist experience of the Gospel, let's say;
but these aren't shareable in the same way. They're
not objective. Or, take that Fundamental experience
with the Christian faith experience of guilt and
forgiveness. I suppose one could say we all share the
experience of guilt, but we might not want to call it
guilt; but the analyst will have one way to talk about
it, and you and I, if we're Christian, would have
another way of talking about it. But the center of
our faith stems from that experience, insofar as it
stems from any experience.

Now, the scientist would be boggle-eyed
as to what to do with that, and a guy like Skinner


would say, it ain't real. Freudian might say, well,
it goes back to Daddy and so forth and so on. So
that the experiences are significantly different,
and one can see in the example of Skinner, Freud, and
so on, that what is meant by the limitation of science
-- and I would say that's a very important issue
in this case -- the fact it isn't scientific doesn't
mean it's not there.

And just aside from the question of
religion, just on the issue of understanding humans,
the "why" question can't be got at; but I think it's
absolutely basic. Here, it's basic to law. They
can't adopt Skinner. They take intention seriously.
What did you intend with this? Was it accidental or
intentional? I take it these are important legal
categories. Well, that's a hairy one to get at,
as you know.

Now, there are experiences that are almost
impossible scientifically to deal with; right? If
you understand what I mean. By that, it doesn't
mean it's not true; it means that this is a method
with limits to it. And so I would say that the
experiences, the kind -- and the facts, the kind of
facts we're dealing with, the fact of guilt would be
very important to me; the fact of fear of death would


be very important to me. These may be facts that
someone else would think were, what, effects rather
than causes, a phenomena, and so forth.

How many religions would take those
very -- as Buddhism did, suffering. This is a real
clue to what's real for them. This is not a scientific
point of view. So their very science is resident in
its theories; not its facts. And their very definite
rulings on what can count as a theory in this and
what cannot. There, the consensus of the community
is about the only real litmus paper as you go along.
There's nobody else.

We theologians and you lawyers can't say --
we can say, well, we were not experts, and I imagine
the same is true of law.

Q How are the kinds of authorities that
are appealed to different in science than religion?

A In our tradition, that is, the Christian
tradition, the fundamental authority -- and there's
been disagreement on this, obviously, between various
groups. There has been Scripture in church in the
Catholic tradition, Scripture in the early Protestant
tradition, among some groups that I don't know whether
we want to call them Protestant or not, but what we
call the left wing of the affirmation or the sectarian


group, it was the spirit, the Holy Spirit speaking;
and if one asks about this group or that group, one
has a mix of these three in various forms.

Actually, I think it's pretty hard not
to find any group that doesn't add -- that's Christian
that doesn't add Scripture some way, the way we
interpret the Scripture is one way and experience in
some kind of a mix. This would be true of the Baptists,
and so forth and so on. It's hard to say just how
that mix works out.

Now, as I say, when you get a philosophical
theologian on the elite level or an intelligent lay
person trying to think all this out as everybody has
to do, they'll say -- they'll begin to talk about
the authority of coherence and adequacy, and back where
people are talking about what they believe, you'll
probably find that, as well as the Bible; right?

Now, this is simply very different from
authority in science, which is methodologically the
authority of repeatable experiment, combined with
-- now, mind you, I'm not an expert here; I'm just --
but I'm answering.

Combined with the fittingness of this
tested theory, it hasn't been classified -- right --
to other theories that are established; it's coherence


with other theories, and they all see its fruitfulness.
It's hard for a nonscientist to put flesh on the
bones of that word "fruitful," but I can imagine what
it means. I think you can, too -- leaving to other
questions, to other insights. And they admin this
had been there from the beginning, simplicity. But
I would say the crucial experiment is always there;
the possibility of falsification is always there, if
not of the total theory, at least of its parts. And
by the very nature of the case, no religious theory
can be falsified; right? The meaning of faith --
one of the meanings of faith is anything that happens.
I still believe in God; so if a person says, well,
if that happens, if I stop being vice president, then
I won't believe in God, you've got a falsification,
but you haven't got a religion.



(The luncheon recess was held.)

Q (By Mr. Campbell) How are the characters
of the series which are appealed to different in
science than religion?

A Science, over the years of its modern
development, has come to recognize, again, this is
the concensus of a community, mind you, that what
they are looking for is -- what we ordinarily call a
law which more particularly I understand is a set of
invariable relations that applies universally.
Logically, it is the "if P, then Q." Granted, if
this, then such and such will follow. That is what
they are looking for. As I remarked, the historian
is in a little different ball park there. Somebody
may want a law about something historical. That is
a little different, though. "If P, then Q," is
universal. You don't have a scientific law that
isn't universal granted the condition that, "If P,
then Q." It is automatic, so to speak. The words,
"necessary," is a little heavy there. Modern
physics is uncomfortable with the word "necessary."
Since you have now random movements on the various
particles. So you have a statistical account. But
nevertheless, you have got, "if this, then that." So
you have a universalness automatic, and therefore


tending toward the material. I think that is the
tendency, toward the physicalistic explanation. This
is why you have got such tremendous arguments in
psychology and so on, and arguments as to whether it
is scientific or not. And the groups that start
talking about introspection and purpose and intention
are called by the others nonscientific. This is what
the behaviorists say to the analysts and so forth and
so on. So that is a shady area, is Freud scientific
or not.

I would say the argument is because if
what I have been talking about. Also, what kind of
sharable experience do you have in a dream or in the
interpretation of that dream? The same obviously is
true with sociology and so on. The hard scientists
laugh when these people use the word: "science." And
the other people are deeply, mortally insulted. But
you tend in this direction as a scientific theorem.

This is certainly what Darwin thought to
do and Lyle thought to do in geology. This has built
within it the principle of some sort of uniformity.
Otherwise, we can't possibly observe these processes
which are part of the rule. This is not just an
aspect of certain kinds of science, it is basic to its
procedure. There, the historian would agree.


I can come along and explain why
Constantine was over his brother by the fact the
angels appeared at the bridge. I am not giving an
historical explanation. I am not appealing to
processes that you and I can look at, to disease, to
excellence of generalship, to supplies, so forth.
Notice that at that level you don't have an exclusion
of intentional causes.

Purposes, most historians would say, are
very deeply part of it. But that doesn't mean it is
not stuck with secondary causes and so on. But
generally, one wouldn't call that science. At least,
I would be hesitant to use the word there. Certainly,
it is not a natural science or physical science.

So you have a necessary universal automatic
formula or law as the character of a scientific theory.
This is testable, but limited. A religious theory
seeks to talk about the whole. It is immediately
then beyond, as I said, beyond falsification, beyond
crucial experiments. It generally appeals to things
we don't experience all the time. In fact, the
doctrine of creation is a different denial of ordinary
experience. None of us experience creation out of
nothing. When the doctrine of creation was originally
formulated, that is, reflectively, in the early church,


it said the two types of creation that we experience
were denying. That is, the creation was typically
say of the Father, of the Son, right, where out of
the substance of something comes something. This
is the model we have for the Trinity. We don't mean
you and you and you. And the image of the carpenter
and the cabinet, because the wood is already there.
These two meanings of creation, this is a unique
act. You and I can't repeat it. We can't even
begin to repeat any of its component parts. Thus,
it's authority is Revelation, because it is not
ordinary experience. It is not the opposite of
ordinary experience, but certainly is defined as
outside of it. It is explaining how ordinary
experience got there. And that can't be part of
ordinary experience, logically. Any process you can
find around us is going to be the process in which
ultimate original appear or in which that question
is resolved. Within that tradition, in every one
of its cases, the ultimate question of "how,"
received. No one knows how God did it. From beginning
to end, they don't answer that one. You won't find
anybody from Augustine on that will say how. They
will all say why. They will say that and why.

That is precisely the opposite of what the


scientist is interested in. He is bored with anything
that isn't a "how" explanation. Tell me how it
happens. You say, well, I don't know that. I tell you
that it happened, and I believe that. I tell you
why it happened, because I believe God is a loving
God and so forth. Also, you have certain Scriptural
passages. God looked at the world and saw it was good,
and so forth and so on. If you take that all apart,
you will find lots of differences.

I have divided it up, what kinds of facts
and experiences are appealed to, what kinds of
questions are asked, what kinds of authorities are
recognized, and what are the different characteristics.

Q Have you had an opportunity to read Act

A I don't remember it verbatim. Let me say
that. But I have read it.

MR. CAMPBELL: Off the record.

(A discussion was held off the record.)

(Gilkey Exhibit 1 was
thereupon marked for identi-
fication by the reporter.)

MR. SIANO: Let the record reflect
that we have marked from the papers produced
by Plaintiff, from Professor Gilkey's file,
as Gilkey Exhibit No. 1, a copy of Act 590


of 1981, the State of Arkansas.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) First, Mr. Gilkey,
when did you first recognize a copy of Act 590?

A When a discussion began to take place as
to whether I would be a witness.

Q When was that?

A I would have to look at the correspondence
to know the exact date.

MR. SIANO: Let me state for the
record that that occurred in the summer
of 1981.

(A recess was held.)

Q (By Mr. Campbell) We established before
the break that it was approximately in the summer of
1981 when you first examined Act 590?

A Yes.

Q As a person, certainly not as an expert,
I know you will not be testifying to this, but what
does balance treatment mean to you?

A Roughly equal time, I take it.

Q In Section 2 of Act 590, what does the
phrase "prohibition against religious instruction"
mean to you?

A It means one doesn't mention the word
God, I would think,except in a -- as I say, in a course


on comparative world views. This is very appropriate.
I take it in this context, it means that the bringing
in of God as a cause in this case, first cause,
obviously is religious instruction.

Q Looking at Section 4A of Act 590, which
is the definition section, there is a definition of
Creation Science which states that Creation Science
means the scientific evidences for creation and
inferences from those scientific evidences. Creation
Science includes the scientific evidences and related
inferences that indicate -- and then it lists six
different parts to that definition. You stated a
moment ago Creation Science might be considered a
rational form of religious tradition?

A Right.

Q In what respect is the sudden creation of
the universe, energy, and life from nothing, a rational
form of religious tradition?

A Well, No. 2 gets striked out as purely
negative against another view, right.

Q I'm sorry. No. 2?

A No. 2, A4, A2, so we have the sudden
creation of the universe from nothing. We have the
concept of permanent species, as it has been called
in the discussion, fixed species, right. We have the


concept of a special creation of human beings. I take
it, also, a special creation of apes. In either case,
a special creation. We have the concept of catastro-
phism, which is interesting. I am not sure from the
context what the cause of catastrophism is certain to

Certainly, the world-wide flood is taken
as Got to be the cause of it. I suppose one could
have a catastrophe that appeals to secondary causality.
The first one is not a theory until one introduces
God. There is no concept there. This is admitted
in the literature of Christian Science. From nothing
means nothing else is there. Therefore, the only thing
that could make this a theory is to bring in the agent
God. There you are in religion.

I myself, am not functioning as a
philosopher of science, which I am not, but as an
amateur in this, and would wonder what the phrase
"scientific evidence" means. I think one could
just say evidence.

If one adds the word scientific, one means
sensory, sharable data. As I indicated, it is my
understanding that science resides in theories, not as
data. They may have been uncovered in the process of
scientific exploration of data. It is the theoretical


structure that makes a science. And so the words
scientific facts is a kind of popularization. Science
doesn't reside in the facts; it resides in the theories.

Now, I would say that my general impression
is that "A" has no theoretical content. It is in
fact not a model until God is introduced as the
central agent. In that sense, while Nos. 1 through
6 don't mention God, they all directly entail God,
or there is nothing that is said, except for No. 2,
which is merely negative, a useful and interesting
negative criticism of the theory of evolution.

If dear, old Newton was criticized, then
anybody is up for grabs in terms of the history of

Number one is meaningless without the
divine activity. As I have indicated, permanent species
going right back to the beginning, are equally
meaningless without the divine activity. That is,
there is no explanation for them unless God created
them. This is historically the view. The origin of
species was a theological, not a scientific problem.
This is the origin of the hills and the valleys and
so forth, was a theological, not a scientific problem,
prior to geology. And the same with No. 4, because
it really implies 3, doesn't it? No, 5, I don't know.


As I say, that is ambiguous, because there
are many distinctions between secondary and primary
causality. I would have to read the literature of
catastrophism, the catastrophism that was popular
among the scientists from about 1790 to 1820, and was a
scientific theory. It moved into the Minister's
realm, so to speak, after that. But anyway, it
certainly entailed the divine activity for those
catastrophies. The definition of a catastrophe was
not like Mt. St. Helen. That is a catastrophe, but
not what we mean here. We mean something of which
the causes are quite out of line with ordinary causes.

Now, is that a natural explanation or
supernatural? I leave it to you. That is to say,
one would have to explore that a good deal in order
to find out whether God is involved there. To me,
catastrophism is a perfectly respectible -- I guess
that is a good word -- scientific theory if it
offers secondary causality as its theory. It has no
theory up to that point. It merely says such and
such are facts.

To have a theory, you have got to have an
explanation, what kind of a process brings this about,
and as I am saying, there is no theory or model
without introducing God.


Now, I am not going to be committed on
No. 5, that point. I am pretty sure about No. 6,
because I think you can't explain anything in terms
of fossils, as this is admitted. A recent history
of the earth demands a supernatural cause.

If you adopt the fact we are not going to
try to talk about it in terms of supernatural causes,
then you are stuck with a long, long time. I think
the geologist, as well as the biologist, would agree
there. But I am not speaking as an expert. I would
say Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 6 are meaningless as theory
without God. Therefore, No. 4a is, to me, taken
literally. But the books don't do this. This is a
theory without content, as so stated, a model without
being a model, setting forth certain -- well, I don't
want to say so-called, because that sounds as if I
don't think they are true -- but certain things that
are claimed to be facts, but leaving out the
explanation. But a model without the explanation
principle is not a model. It is merely -- it merely
sets you a problem. And insofar as the model is
going to be taught, God is going to be right there
in the center. We have the teaching of religion, as
I say, and the particular form of a particular
religion. I would argue that section 4a is in


contraction to the first full sentence in Section 5.

Q Recognizing you are not going to testify
to this, but do you think that the -- as a teacher --
that the presentation of divergent views in the class-
room may lead to a better appreciation by students
of the subject matter which is being discussed?

MR. SIANO: I am going to object
on the grounds that that question is very
vague. But I will let Professor Gilkey
answer it.

A (Continuing) It all depends, for its
usefulness, on squaring up views with something
fundamentally in common. It also depends upon being
perfectly clear that these are not the only two
alternatives on the scene, which is part of the problem
we have. I would say that with regard to the question
of where do we come from, as an ultimate question,
and why are we here, it is extremely useful that various
points of view be put forward. I would be the first
to argue for the teaching of this. And I would welcome
anybody doing Creation Science; or in that case, they
could really come forward, full-blown, onto the
center of the stage, and say, let's present the
Biblical view as this group interprets the Biblical


Then I would want to get in the act and
say, this is what I think about it. I would be inter-
ested in getting a Jew in there, and whoever else is
relevant to the scene, and talking about Greek myths,
and see why each one of these makes more sense to
the whole business than the others. This is a
comparative necessarily, comparative religion,
comparative this, that, and the other kind of class.
These are not generally alternatives, it seems to
me, that we have here. In that case, I don't see
the usefulness, and I do see the problem. They are
not alternatives in the sense that one of them has --
does follow the rules. Here again, I am not an
expert, but I have looked at it, the rules of scientific
inquiry. The other one, on the other hand, is clearly
based upon religious authority. However, it prunes
itself and gets a haircut. But as I say, if it gets
too much of a haircut, the head is gone. And they
really aren't comparable. They are not mutually

And when I say these are alternatives,
it misleads the situation. It leads to the conclusion
that my view is not an alternative, which personally,
I find offensive. You either believe in Darwin or you
believe in Genesis. I do not think this is the case.


I am not arguing for Darwin there. That is simply not
true, as far as I can see. And the main body of
Christian churches in the world agree on that. At
that point, this is very, very tricky. They aren't
alternatives in that sense. Especially presented them
as the alternative means you have either got to be
a literalist and fundamentalist, or you have got to
be an atheist. This would empty our churches. I
would be worried about that. I am speaking quite
personally. It would get rid of the Presbyterian
Church in Little Rock and get rid of the Methodist
Church, and get rid of a good section of the Southern
Baptist Churches. If they want to do that, and they
may -- I am speculating there -- that is why the
churches are against it. So I would say, setting
them as alternatives is wildly misleading, and that
is really the point of my witnessing.

Now, in a sense, these two views come
across as the legal alternative, as saying either/or.
And in the writing, you find this admitted and then
taken back. As in many of the writings, this is the
test. Without this, you are an atheist. But then in
other sections, they would say, of course, one doesn't
need Creation Science to be religious. But I would say
the impact educationally would be you either are a


Christian or you are involved in the whole operation
of modern science. This isn't just evolution. This
is geology. This is astrophysics, physics. This
penetrates all the way out to the missile.

Q With regard to apologetics, which were
the third item you may talk about at trial, would you
again define for me what apologetics means?

A It is the enterprise on the part of
certain people within a given religious community
to argue for the truth, the meaningfulness and the
truth of that religious position; maybe not all of
it. They may say say some of this, we can prove, and
some of it we can't. Okay. But it is the effort to
show the credibility of a religious community's
belief, convictions, doctrines, truths, whatever you
wish to say. This is the meaning of apologetics.

Let me say that is the fundamental
enterprise at stake here, which, when they are not
writing this way, is very clear. They are seeking
to argue for the scientific aspect of the Genesis
account. In that sense, it is apologetics.

We make better sense of the facts that
have been unearthed in modern inquiry than any other
view. It is an apologetic argument. I would say
the Christian view of history makes more sense than


a naturalistic view of history. That is an apologetic.
It seeks a common ground and the argument one makes
that that common ground is more intelligent than the
other. That is really philosophical argument. It
is not scientific argument.

Q What is atheism?

A Just what it says, the belief that
reality does not include anything to which the word
God is appropriately attached, I suppose. Though,
that is a pretty quick definition.

Q Would atheism be a religion, as you have
defined religion today?

A Yes. Yes -- well,no. I don't know. Let
me take that back. It doesn't have a community.
It doesn't have a way of life, necessarily. The
humanist society may well come to function the
ethical culture society as it was formed by Adler
in New York. They met regularly. They have a way
of life and so forth and so on. It is a religious
view in a certain limited sense. I wouldn't call it
a religion under my own definition. It is a religious
view in the sense it gives a picture of the whole.
And probably as you begin to spell it out, it fits
pretty well with that number one. It tries to tell
us what is wrong with our world and how we can be,


insofar as it begins to talk about the problem of
life and rescue from it. It begins to have religious
characteristics. I would be more inclined to call it
a philosophy.

Q Would there be -- given that definition,
would there be such a thing as atheistic apologetics?

A Yes, sure. Any guy coming along and
saying religion is bunk, I can show it is wrong.
Freud is an atheist apologetic when he talks about
religion. Marx is the same way. There are a number
of them around. I am debating with them all the
time. "Marx: Religion doesn't make any sense. It
is incredible; it is harmful," and so forth and so

There is a religious humanism. But as
we usually use the word, it indicates someone who
doesn't believe there is any diety anywhere, and there
shouldn't be. And they will give arguments, of course,
for it. I am using the word in a pretty broad sense,
because generally, apologetic has been associated
with the community.

Q In religion -- and I will confine that
to the Western religion which we have been talking
about today -- if you are ultimately concerned or
committed to one thing, are you automatically


uncommitted or disassociated with its opposite?

MR. SIANO: I don't understand
that question. I object to it. It is
very obscure. I will ask you to rephrase

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Do you understand the

A I am glad to have you rephrase it, though
I can probably put it together into a question that I
can answer.

Q You can probably do that better than I,
but I will try to rephrase it.

A Right. You rephrase it.

Q If a Christian as we have talked about
today in the sense of the Western religion, is
committed to creation, which we have established is
an inherently Christian ethic, so to speak, is a
Christian automatically then opposed to noncreation?

A There we have to unpack your word

MR. SIANO: I would also like to
unpack "noncreation." I am a little
confused on that term.

A (Continuing) Let me say I am interested
in unpacking the word "opposed" here. Historically


it meant I would like to cut off their head. That is
the heavy meaning of opposed, let's say. They are
no longer a citizen. They get put in jail, persecuted.
Our joint tradition, Baptist tradition, said this
isn't right. That is the best thing they ever said,
though many of them now will happily cut off the head
of some of those who disagree. That is our tradition.
That is what Roger Williams said. He was a great
founder of our tradition in this country.

Now, if you mean intellectually opposed,
in terms of disagreement, I would say, of course.
This is a fair argument. You mean opposed in the
sense of -- let's use the word charity, tolerance,
love, brotherhood, I would say absolutely not. And
this is what we have learned. Otherwise, I couldn't
discourse with the Buddhist. I couldn't be friends
with the Buddhist, couldn't respect the Buddhist.
So I would say I will argue with the Buddhist, but
he or she is a brother or sister.

I personally respect their position as
to say I recognize it has truth in it. That gets
touchy. That gets very touchy. And I would say
this isn't a new problem for us all. It has always
been there, and we have given the wrong answer.
I am speaking personally.


With the Jews, I think Paul gave the
right answer, they still have the Covenant, but that
certainly hasn't been the church's answer. But as I
indicated earlier, they are a special case. That
isn't a fair treatment of what you are getting at.

We certainly learned to live with the
atheists. And often, they have shown they are better
citizens than we are. Anybody who consigns Mahatma
Ghandi to hell, it seems to me they ought to have
their Christian head examined. That is my opinion,
because there was an obvious Saint, according to almost
every criteria of Jesus' teachings, this man did
everything for everybody. The early church, incidentally
felt this about Socrates and spoke even about the
covenant with the Greeks, because they could not
put Socrates down the drain. And when one reads the
dialogues, one can see why. This is not Jesus, but
it is a figure, a tremendous figure. Whether this
is the historical Socrates or not -- and they, of
course, thought it was, and I think it probably was --
the issue of Socrates' salvation came up. Most of
them didn't want to say, it is too bad that he is
going to fry, you know. This is a very interesting,
difficult problem. I would say it is a new problem
because the question of the truth content of other


points of view is now arising for the West in a new
way. Now we can go on forever about this. I don't
want, as an expert, to be testifying in this. This
is way off base. But I am quite willing to say this
is an interesting problem.

No one, under any circumstances, can
stand nowhere in particular. That is the first
think. If I stop being a Christian in a discussion
with a Buddhist, I become sacrilegious. I am still
standing somewhere. I am in a position. There is
no way of escaping that. So there is no way of
even raising the question without standing somewhere.
Now, the question is, if you are standing there, you
affirm it, you have got to affirm it. There is an
absoluteness here. I see the world as a question.
But I have to see the world so that that guy can stand
where he is standing and I don't cut off his head.
That is the problem and you can't make an easy, logical
solution to that absoluteness. I first realized
this in talking to a Buddhist.

If we are involved in a conversation, I
didn't want him to stop being a Buddhist. He merely
became a Japanese secularist. By the same token,
I wasn't going to stop being a Christian. This
raises a question of the dialect of the absolute


and the relative, which is not easy to put together.
I don't want to get in a court and put it together.
This is kind of an intellectual puzzle in the human
problems that our generation has the task of
exploring. This is involved in anything called a
dialogue, and I am deeply involved. I thoroughly
believe this is closer to what God wants us to be
in relation to each other than my saying I have
absolute truth and you have absolute error. So it
depends upon what you mean by the word opposed. But
that is my view of it.

Q Is evolution an inherently impersonal

MR. SIANO: I am going to object to
the question unless you can define evolution
and impersonal, and probably inherent, too.
But I will let that go.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Speaking of it in the
sense of Darwin's Theories of Evolution, is it secular
as opposed to religious?

A It is a very complicated matter. As a
scientific theory, it is by definition secular. This
doesn't say atheistic. It includes only natural
processes. Darwin interpreted it that way, though
he was pulled about it. But he was so afraid of


messing up the theory that he was developing, that he
wanted to leave any kind of divine causation out of
it. His friends said he was crazy, and Wallace argued
he couldn't make any sense out of it without some kind
of divine activity. And he always said, I don't know
about that. That is not what I am trying to say.
Therefore, your question asks, really, what level are
we talking about when we use the word "evolution"?
Or what do we do with this? As a scientific concept,
I would say it is like every other scientific concept.
It can only recognize secondary causality. And,
therefore, is a preory, non-religious.

Now, many people can take it as an
explanation of the whole of the universe and say
this is the exclusive explanation. There is
nothing else to say. Then it has expanded into a
philosophical, semi-religious, mythical concept,
as with Herbert Spencer, as in the implication of
T. H. Huxley, as in a number of people. I would
say that it is the last chapter of a good number of
books. And I would be prepared to argue with this.
This is clearly an expansion of a biological law
into a universal law. And it was very common in
the Nineteenth Century, and is much less common now,
though the aura of this remains.


There, it is functioning as a philosophical
religious symbol, or a symbolic system, and I would
be inclined to agree.

But I would disagree with this. This is
quite different. Actually, Marxism is an interesting
parallel, if I might say. Here is something that starts
out in political economy and expands its way out. It
is functioning not unlike what I said, one, two, three.
It is holding the communities together, providing
the bases of education and behavior of the whole works,
and it is answering the question of good and evil.

Many people have argued Marxism as a
religion. I wouldn't say evolution, because it is
a Johnny-come-lately idea, but I would say the
liberal theory has become a civil religion, secular
religion, and so forth. It is what we believe in,
what we think is going to resolve all our problems.
It is balanced by Marxism; both of them starting in
science and moving up. When they move up, that is
something else. I don't think evolution is inherent
in this way any more than Newton is. And there were
many ways that theology accepted and dealt with
Newton. And that is, these are the theologists of
the Eighteenth Century, largely. I don't think they
were very good theologists. As I said, the theologists


of both the reformed Jewish tradition, reformed and
the liberal Protestant tradition, are taking the
scientific doctrine of evolution and expanding it.
This is a way of explicating the atheistic belief,
as is Creation Science. So I would say evolution
in one sense is inherently atheistic; in another
sense, not at all. It depends on how one is using
it. Is that clear?



Q Yes. What does metaphysical mean?

MR. SIANO: Are we trying to get a
dictionary definition here, Mr. Campbell?

MR. CAMPBELL: We have talked about
physical and metaphysical.

MR. SIANO: Are you just trying to get
a frame of reference, then?

MR. CAMPBELL: Right, for our dis-

A (Continuing) Well, this is one of those
words, when defining, one spells out one's own posi-
tion. This is a controversial definition. I would
use the word as examining the general structures of
realigy in every one of its forms, those structures
that apply to every aspect of experience. This is
Whitehead's definition. Now, one can say, isn't that
science? No, because science doesn't include the
subject. The guy in the white coat is left out.
You and I stretched on the table is what they are
talking about. But the guy in the white coat with
the stethoscope is omitted. Skinner isn't talked
about in books about Skinner. That is a controversial
argument. I think you get what I am talking about.
If one begins to include the subject as well as the
object, you are in philosophy. Obviously, you have


moved out of science; you have examined the scientific
mind, as well as the inquired object. Immediately,
you are into arguments about materialism, idealism,
is everything spirit, is everything matter, neither
one of which can make an awful lot of coherent sense.
I mean, everybody's arguments are probably right at
this point in time.

I am a theologian; I am not a physician.
I think that God transcends the metaphysical categories
because those are the structures of our experience, and
our experience is creaturally experience, though we
can still talk about God. That is where I am in
regard to that. I am interested in it, but I don't
put my money on it.

Now, metaphysics comes into our conversa-
tion in that I would say naturalism, not in the sense
of a botanist, but is a metaphysical position; aetheism
is a metaphysical position; dualism is a metaphysical
position. There are a number of alternatives here,
each one with its different doctrine of origin, though
they don't mean by that what we mean by it, as I
have said. They ask those kinds of questions, what
is it all like, what is the whole like, what is the
whole universe like, the kinds of questions that make
scientists very nervous. They think this is verbiage


or preferences, as they put it. There are also a
lot of scientists who are religious and might be
interested in metaphysics. But generally, when I
talk about Evolution expanding itself into a world
view, you are quite right to bring up metaphysics.
For it to be a metaphysical doctrine, it would have
to be explicated in terms of the rules of metaphysical
thinking. I would say probably the greatest example
of this is Whitehead, in our tradition.

MR. SIANO: His name has come up
before in this.

A (Continuing) I am sure. Here is a system
setting out not to be a theology, but to explain all
experiences, to explain it as a process developing
so that it can take in physics, biology, artistic
experience, moral experience, et cetera. You see
immediately you have moved out of science there. We
assume responsibility in law that we have to put into
our system, so that every aspect of experience is
made intelligible in terms of one set of ideas. This
is what the metaphysician is after.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Is scientific inquiry
as we have talked about today generally set within
a framework of presupposition?

A (Witness nods head affirmatively.)


MR. SIANO: You are going to have to
define presupposition in this context.
Professor Gilkey is not a scientist. That
word may have particular meanings in a
theological and philosophical context,
and then have different meanings in a
scientific context. I am troubled by it.

MR. CAMPBELL: Let the record
reflect the witness shook his head yes.

(Whereupon, a discussion was held
off the record.)

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Assuming that scientific
inquiry is based on some -- within a framework of
presupposition, could a theory ever be truly falsified?

MR. SIANO: Now, that is a hypothetical

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Do you understand
what I am asking?

MR. SIANO: You started out with
"assuming," and that is why I asked if it
is a hypothetical question. Is it a
hypothetical question?

MR. CAMPBELL: Yes, it can be a hypo-
thetical question. Actually, it is a
philosophical question.


MR. SIANO: It may be a philosophy
of science question.

THE WITNESS: It is a totonogy. He
has just uttered a totonogy.

A (Continuing) Falsification itself has
presupposition, which is your answer. Without the
presuppositions that lie in back of the scientific
method, there is no meaning to the word falsification.
We have to agree to having a mode of falsifying what
kind of data are relevant, what kind of experience
gets us in touch with those data, what kind of
methods are relevant. We have to agree on that. You
and I might say, if we live somewhere else, we have
to have a Shawmanic (phonetically) experience to
falsify an interesting view. When you say falsifica-
tion, you are probably talking westernly A Hindu
falsification might be quite different.

Now, there are two kinds of -- should I
say two kinds of meanings referenced to the word
presupposition here, it seems to me, that are rele-
vant. I agree thoroughly with the fact that science
exists within the matrix of Western culture insofar
as it moves outside of it and it converts that culture.
That matrix here is not directly religious, though
it has religious roots. It believes the material


world is real. They may say, oh, we don't. But I
think they do. Therefore, sensory experience gets
in touch with reality. This is not a necessary
proposition at all and not necessarily agreed to.
It is a way of wandering through the world of
illusion, so to speak. Your word falsification would
have a different meaning. These are metaphysical
presuppositions. There are a whole number of them
that come to be in our Western culture. They have
partly biblical roots, which we could talk about,
and partly Greek. They certainly involve the sense
of the reality in order of the material world, which
arises out of the doctrine of Creation, which I have
argued in many of my books. It also has certain
Greek roots. It also argues that we don't know what
is going to be out there until we look and see. We
don't know God's ways, so let's see what He did. We
don't understand God's ways in creating, and therefore,
we have got to look and see what they are. These
are some of the metaphysical aspects.

Now, you don't need to be a Christian to
hold these. That is one set of presuppositions to
modern science. In this sense, I am not a Positivist
who thinks it exists by itself. This is useful in
metaphysics, then it explores those presuppositions.


That is what the metaphysicist is doing.

I would prefer to call them canons of
the science, rules, limited requirements, which is a
better word, to science. You might call those pre-
suppositions. I would prefer to call them canons,
which are the ones we have been talking about, the
limitations; this kind of theory, not that kind of
theory. Those are not presuppositions. The scientist
comes into the laboratory with them. This is what
you mean by the method and its limits. I have tried
to stress that. That is another sense of the word
presupposition. It is entailed, but it is in the
canons. It is the rules of the road, the particular
rules of the road which do have their presuppositions.
They are the same ones we have been talking about.

Material reality is real. This is what
we wish to explain. We can understand it rationally
in some sense if we go at it empirically, and so forth
and so on. I think they also have presuppositions
about the subject, which science itself doesn't
give us any explication of.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) I know you have dis-
cussed your writings, the idea of leaps, scientific
leaps of creative vision that you have talked about.

A You have done your homework.


Q Are there any common characteristics
of those men which you have written about in terms
of creative leaps?

A (Witness nods head affirmatively.)

Q Have you ever sat down and tried to pin
down some common characteristics?

A I suppose I thought about them. But that
takes a different kind of expertise than I have got.
This is something for the philosopher and historian
of science who really knows the biography of these
people. This is a biographical matter, to some extent,
and notes in great detail the scientific theoretical
world of the person as they enter, let's say, the
mythical laboratory at this point, or sit under the
tree and the apple falls on their head, or something,
and they can see what happens here.

MR. SIANO: You are not going to
speculate, are you?

A (Continuing) I am not going to speculate.
That is beyond my capacity, that there is something
like a unifying intuition that takes place; I don't
think there is any doubt, whether you are talking
about Archimides or Newton or Capernicus or whoever;
those that write about it, be an expert on it,
demand an intimacy of what is going on. It will have


ifs own presuppositions, anything written about that.
You may figure it out in terms of toilet training,
for all I know.

MR. SIANO: Mr. Campbell, we are
getting, not close to plane time, but
plane time is approaching here, the day
before Thanksgiving, and I would offer that
to you so you do not miss any of the salient
aspects in your outline of questioning
Mr. Gilkey.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Were those men who
took the leaps generally considered as in the main
stream of the scientific community in those times?

MR. SIANO: I object to the question,
unless we identify who we are talking

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Well, let's talk about
Newton, for an example, or Capernicus, or Galileo.

MR. SIANO: All of them?

Q (By Mr. Campbell) We will start with

A He was a pretty strange bird, because he
was a rather wild creature on certain things, much
more so than the others, because he was building on
Galileo. Galileo was new, and Capernicus was even


newer. The originators of the scientific view are
not in accord with the scientific consensus at that

Q Is truth a legitimate goal of science?

MR. SIANO: Objection. Again, Mr.
Campbell, you are outside the witness'
expertise. I don't know what sort of an
opinion question that is.

MR. CAMPBELL: Mr. Siano, the witness
has written volumes and volumes concerning
this issue. This is not something he is
just --

MR. SIANO: I am not going to argue with
you about what the witness has or has not
written. I am suggesting to you he has
been tendered in a certain capacity. I am
not going to direct him not to answer.

A (Continuing) No scientist thinks he or
she is going to get the truth. In fact, science has
rearrange the view of truth for most of us. This has
been a very important creative activity, to make us
realize human truth is always an approximation of the
truth. This, in turn, has had great effect upon the
religious community and has partly led to that. I
wish it had penetrated to some of the other social


sciences. But that is neither here nor there.

I would say there is nothing to science if
it is not directed at approximating the truth. This
is a cognitive endeavor. The cognitive endeavor
gets its meaning from erost towards the truth, it's
longing to find it. When you get a genuine scientist,
this is all he or she cares about. If it is directed
at making money, forget it. I would say the same
with the legal profession, in some sense. Without some
concern for justice, it is not going to happen. This
sounds sentimental, but it is true. If everybody
can be bought, then forget it. In that sense, the
truth is related to the cognitive activity of human
beings. I would insist that science is not the only
way to get at the truth. This is their basic erost.
That is the only word to use. Desire is not the
right word, but it is that which draws me, or the
ultimate concern. If a scientist doesn't have an
ultimate concern for truth, he or she is not a
scientist, and they will fiddle with the evidence,
and you don't have science.

Now, their science as a community begins
to sound not only moral, but a little bit religious.
I would be quite willing to explore that. But the
erost for the truth here is held by the commitment to


the canons. That is the intention within which a
guy like Saulk or Einstein or whoever functions.

Q Looking at these documents, this folder
that is marked Scientific Creationism, Morris, is
this simply a reprint of his book?

A Yes.

MR. CAMPBELL: Mr. Siano, if I wanted
to make copies of these documents, a few,
not necessarily all of them, would you
please send them to me?

MR. SIANO: I would be glad to if
you would just tell me what you want
copied. I will see that these are sent
to you.

MR. CAMPBELL: I would like a copy of
the documents contained in the folder,
Pro-Evolution documents.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Mr. Gilkey, are you
on the mailing list of any organizations which
support the teaching of Creation Science in the public
school system?

A No.

Q Are you on the mailing list of any organiza-
tion which is opposed to the teaching?

A Yes, the AAAS; that is, I am restrictedly


on their mailing list. We have had correspondence
about this subject; that is, the folder in there
(indicating). I am not a member of that organization.

There is a group called the Committee of
Correspondence -- why, I don't know -- in Chicago,
one meeting of which I have attended; and which
regularly send me their documents. That is in a
folder there called the Aulie Group. This is a group
of biology teachers, geology teachers, and so forth,
that are concerned about this whole subject. They
send out articles and this and that and the other,
all of which I have received is in that folder. I'm
not a member in the sense of having joined, paid
dues. I attended these meetings, and I am generally
interested in what they are doing. I am not a member.

Q How was it that you accumulated a great
amount of information from the Kelly Segraves

A Well, the "how" is sitting on my right.

MR. SIANO: Let the record reflect
that counsel for Plaintiffs have made
materials available to the witness.

THE WITNESS: Though I brought the
book there.

MR. SIANO: Meaning?


THE WITNESS: I want to say it,
because they didn't send me that. I want
to be accurate here. The Creation explana-
tion was bought by me in the Moody Bookstore
in Chicago.

(Whereupon, a discussion was held
off the record.)

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Professor Gilkey,
have you prepared a summary of your testimony or what
you expect to testify to at all?

MR. SIANO: I will state for the
record you ought to quantify that apart
from the dialogue with the lawyers, which
is where we seem to be getting into problem
areas in this.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Have you prepared any
report or documents which generally summarizes what
you expect to testify at trial, and given it to Mr.

A I have.

Q Do you have a copy of that with you?

A I understand that that is part of what
are called the lawyer's working papers or something
to that effect.

Q Just for purposes of the record, I have


got to ask you for it, and Mr. Siano is going to

A So go ahead and do what you want to do.

Q Do you have a copy of it with you?

A Yes.

Q May I see it?

MR. SIANO: No. Objection. The
record should reflect the documents exist
only by virtue of Professor Gilkey's
dialogue with the lawyers. And the docu-
ments, under Rule 26, reflect the operation
of the lawyer's input on the case, and
in our view of the case, constitute trial
preparation material.

MR. CAMPBELL: I would like a copy
of the AAAS file.

Q (By Mr. Campbell) Professor Gilkey, in
one file, you have marked, the Aulie Group. Who is
Richard P. Aulie?

A I really don't know. I think he is a
high school teacher in Chicago, of one of the
natural sciences.

Q How is it you happen to have some --

A Well, that is the little group I spoke
of. He called me on the phone and got my name -- I


don't know how -- probably because he had heard my
name in one connection or another -- and explained
to me what the group was doing, though I don't think
it is a formal group, as I say, and invited me to
come to a meeting, which I did, and then he sent me
some of these documents, or gave them to me. I asked
him for them. I saw those documents and was interested
in reading them, so he gave them to me.

Q This is the Committee of Correspondence
in Chicago?

A That's right. You will see it in the first
letter. I believe it identifies itself there.

MR. CAMPBELL: Mr. Siano, I would
like a copy of the letter addressed to
Dr. Gilkey from Mr. Aulie, dated September
7, 1981.

In addition, I would like a copy of
a letter which appears to be drafted in
memorandum form, from Dr. Richard P. Aulie,
to Professor Gilkey, dated September 8,

And finally, I would like a copy of
the memorandum dated September 4, 1981,
the Chicago Area Committee of Correspondence
signed Dick Aulie at the bottom.


In addition, I would like a copy of
the pamphlet entitled, "Origins and Change,"
which appears in the Journal of the
American Scientific Affiliation.

MR. SIANO: Sure.

MR. CAMPBELL: And finally, a copy of
an article entitled, "The Doctrine of
Special Creation," by Richard P. Aulie,
reprinted from the American Biology Teacher,
April 1972 and apparently again in May --
excuse me, it is April and May of 1972.

Professor Gilkey, I have tried to
keep all of these in order, these files,
hopefully kept them in order to return to
you. I enjoyed the deposition today, and
I appreciate your responsiveness and your
help. Thank you, very much.

MR. SIANO: I take it you have no
further questions?

MR. CAMPBELL: I have no further

MR. SIANO: Mr. Campbell and I have
agreed that the same stipulations as have
been obtained in the two previous deposi-
tions of Plaintiffs' experts will be carried


forward through this deposition; is that
right, Mr. Campbell?

MR. CAMPBELL: That is correct.

(Deposition concluded.)

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